Marco Rubio and the Outlook for North Korean Human Rights Under Trump 2.0
This first appeared as a CSIS Commentary here.
An hour or so after the inauguration of President Donald Trump, Senator Marco Rubio was confirmed by the U.S. Senate to be Secretary of State in the new administration. Unlike many other Trump nominations, the Senate vote to confirm Rubio was noncontroversial. The vote in favor of his confirmation was unanimous, 99–0. (One senate seat was vacant at the time of the vote.) Rubio was formally sworn in and began his tenure the following day on January 21.
Rubio was born in Miami, Florida, in 1971, but his parents were both born in Cuba. They immigrated to Florida in 1956, two-and-a-half years before Fidel Castro seized control in Havana. Rubio was elected to represent Florida in the U.S. Senate in 2010, and he was reelected in 2016 and 2022. He served as senator for 14 years, from 2011 until he resigned his Senate seat to assume the post of secretary of state.
As a U.S. senator, Rubio was well-regarded. He is politically conservative, but he followed Senate practice and worked with other senators in a generally bipartisan fashion. He has also shown significant independence. For example, at the beginning of Trump’s first term as president, Rubio publicly expressed “serious concerns” about Donald Trump’s nomination of Rex Tillerson to serve as secretary of state. Rubio aggressively questioned Tillerson during the public Senate confirmation hearings, raising concern that Tillerson would not get enough votes in the Foreign Relations Committee for the nomination to move to the full Senate for the confirmation vote. Ultimately, Rubio voted to confirm the Exxon executive as secretary of state. Tillerson’s tenure was brief, however, and Trump demanded his resignation after only 14 months at Foggy Bottom.
President Trump expects his appointees to implement his announced policies, and he has moved quickly, taking unusual and controversial steps just hours after he was sworn in as president. In the weeks since his confirmation, Rubio has loyally followed Trump’s policies. He made his important first foreign visit as secretary of state to Panama, consistent with Trump’s announced intention that the United States retake control of the Panama Canal. The symbolism of the first Latino U.S. secretary of state making his first foreign visit as secretary to Latin America is significant, but the message is that the United States will tell Latin America what to do. His visit to Panama, however, was less about Panama than about China, and Rubio’s remarks during the trip focused on the necessity for the government of Panama to limit Chinese influence at the canal.
North Korea in U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities
One of the important foreign policy issues facing the new Trump administration and the new secretary of state is North Korea, which has been increasingly assertive lately. Pyongyang has moved closer to Moscow, including sending North Korean troops to fight alongside Soviet troops in Ukraine. At about the same time, Russia prevented the UN Security Council from continuing to enforce UN sanctions against North Korea for its nuclear weapons program. Kim Jong-un has taken steps that clearly are seen as a threat to South Korea. The country is struggling with domestic turmoil following the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol on December 14, followed less than two weeks later by the impeachment of Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who was serving as acting president after Yoon’s removal from office.
In many ways, the United States relationship with Kim Jong-un remains where it was when Trump left office after losing the 2020 election. Trump has not been particularly vocal on North Korea since his reelection. In an interview at the end of January, he was asked if he intended to “reach out” to North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un. Trump responded, “I will, yeah. He liked me.” Trump’s response clearly did not imply that North Korea was an urgent priority. If Kim shows an interest in improved relations, Trump might be willing to engage with Pyongyang.
On January 30, about the time Trump responded to the media question, the North Koreans were quick and pugnacious in commenting on a media interview with Secretary of State Rubio. In responding to a question, Rubio referred to both North Korea and Iran as “rogue states.” North Korean media quickly blasted the “hostile words and deeds of the person who is in charge of the U.S. foreign policy,” which confirmed to Pyongyang that “the U.S. hostile policy toward [North Korea] remains unchanged.” The antagonistic response was emphasized by the North Korean statement, which referred to “the person who is in charge of U.S. foreign policy,” rather than identifying Secretary of State Rubio by name or title.
The North Korean Human Rights Act and the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights
It will be instructive to see how North Korea is treated in Trump’s second term and how his new secretary of state deals with Pyongyang. On the issue of human rights, one of the key questions will be the reauthorization of the North Korean Human Rights Act and the appointment of a special envoy for North Korean human rights. Will Trump administration 2.0 echo Trump 1.0, or will we see a change, and will there be a greater commitment to human rights?
In July 2018, then-President Trump signed legislation reauthorizing the North Korean Human Rights Act several months after the previous law had expired. The requirement for a special human rights envoy was included in the legislation that was signed into law by Trump, but for the full four years of Trump’s first term (2017–2021), no special envoy was ever nominated. Currently, there is no North Korean Human Rights Act in force because the previous law expired in mid-2022. During the following Democratic administration, President Joe Biden nominated a special envoy two years after he took office. Ambassador Julie Turner was confirmed to serve in that position, and she has done an outstanding job pressing the North Korean human rights agenda.
Legislation extending the North Korean Human Rights Act, which called for the appointment of a special envoy for human rights, was introduced in both the House and Senate before the legislation expired in 2022. Then-Senator Marco Rubio introduced legislation to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act in the Senate in 2021 and it was adopted by the Senate near the end of the legislative session in late 2022. The House, however, did not act on the legislation, so the North Korean Human Rights Act was not extended.
When the 118th Congress convened in January 2023, legislation was again introduced in both the House and the Senate to extend the North Korean Human Rights Act. Again, Marco Rubio (R-FL) introduced the Senate version of the legislation, and the House version of the bill was again introduced by Congresswoman Young Kim (R-CA). This time, the House adopted the North Korean human rights legislation, but the Senate failed to take action.
It is noteworthy that as a U.S. Senator, Marco Rubio was at the forefront of legislative efforts to press for human rights in North Korea. It will be interesting to observe his record on that issue as secretary of state. President Biden appointed a special envoy for North Korean human rights in 2023, although there was no legislation in force at the time stipulating that there should be such an appointment. The president does have the authority to appoint special envoys and to request a person be given ambassadorial rank. When legislation specifically calls for such an appointment, however, it gives the issue and the person greater status.
U.S. Participation in UN Actions on North Korean Human Rights Violations
The United Nations has played a particularly important role in criticizing North Korea’s human rights record. The United States under President Biden played a leading role in raising the issue of North Korean human rights at the UN. The United States was a key participant in supporting discussions of North Korean human rights in the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the UN Human Rights Council. The United States was a leading supporter of the appointment of a special rapporteur to investigate and report to the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly on human rights violations in North Korea. The United States was also a leading advocate for the creation of the UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights violations in North Korea in 2013.
As the transition takes place with the return of Trump and the arrival of Rubio as the new secretary of state, one of the key questions regarding policy toward North Korea is whether the United States will continue to advocate for human rights and remain a participant in the UN Human Rights Council, which has been the central UN body focused on North Korea’s human rights atrocities, as well as human rights abuses in a number of other UN member countries.
In June 2018, 17 months into the first Trump presidential term, U.S. ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held a joint press conference at the Department of State to announce that the United States was withdrawing from participation in the UN Human Rights Council. The invective that the two U.S. government officials spewed out against the UN was surprising, but the reason for withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council was the fact that the U.S. government was strongly criticized by UN human rights organizations, other countries, and human rights groups because of the Trump administration’s policy to separate young children from their parents if they illegally entered the United States seeking political asylum. John Bolton, national security advisor to Trump (2017–2018), was a long-time critic of the UN and its agencies, and the criticism of the United States was the basis for his effort to take the United States out of the UN Human Rights Council. Under Biden, the United States returned to membership and full participation in the UN Human Rights Council.
The Possibility of Future Engagement Between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un
One key question is whether we might see another effort to improve the ties between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The first Trump term began with the president harshly criticizing North Korea in his first speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2017, followed by North Korean defectors sitting with the first lady at Trump’s first State of the Union Address in early 2018. Three days later, Trump met with the North Korean defectors in the Oval Office.
Within a couple of months, however, Trump, softened his rhetoric on North Korea, and a couple of months after the State of the Union Speech Trump announced that he and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would meet in Singapore in June 2018. The meeting there was followed in February 2019 by the failed summit in Hanoi. In 2020 at the suggestion of South Korean President Moon Jae-in when Trump was visiting South Korea, he went to Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea and met briefly with Kim Jong-un. The two had a friendly chat, but no serious negotiation. Trump stepped across the boundary into North Korea, the first serving U.S. president to set foot in North Korea. (In 2009, former President Bill Clinton spent a day in Pyongyang, met with North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, and secured the release of two U.S. journalists who were detained by North Korea, but that visit was several years after he served as president.)
Now in his second term, President Trump may see another summit with Kim Jong-un as an option for getting the media spotlight again, but in the first weeks of the new administration, he has given greater attention to domestic policy actions, and his foreign policy agenda did not include human rights or North Korea. He announced his intention to gain control of the Panama Canal, annex Greenland, make Canada the fifty-first state, and manage Gaza after the Palestinian population was settled elsewhere.
Kim Jong-un is currently focused on his relationship with Russia. Over 10,000 North Korean troops are supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine, and North Korean factories are apparently producing weapons and ammunition for the Russians to use. In recognition of North Korea’s aid, Russia vetoed efforts by the UN Security Council to extend sanctions against North Korea for its nuclear weapons program. Indications are that North Korea is receiving significant Russian aid in gratitude for its military assistance. At present, North Korea has very limited interest in improved relations with the United States. Trump was deeply embarrassed by the dramatic failure of the Hanoi summit. If there is to be another meeting with Kim, Trump will have to be convinced that there will be no repeat of the Hanoi failure.