October 6, 2023, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun— A few weeks after the Kim-Putin summit, satellite imagery show an unprecedented level of rail traffic at the DPRK-Russia border... Closeup of the Tumangang Rail Facility, October 5, 2023. Image shows an unprecedentedly high level of railcar traffic at the North Korean station at the...

February 17, 2023, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun— Analysis of recent commercially available satellite imagery of the Russia–North Korea railroad crossing suggests significantly increased energy and economic trade as Pyongyang seeks to tighten ties with Moscow... An approximate count of the railcars at Khasan and Tumangang shows the movement of railcars…

November 15, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun— Over 16 months after its shutdown of the border with China to prevent COVID transmission, North Korea has seen delays in its efforts to re-open commerce with its primary trade partner. The conversion of Uiju Airbase into a disinfection facility started in early 2021, but the most recent satellite imagery as of November 12 shows no signs of being operational, indicating a delay of at least six months from its original opening plans. Smaller-scale disinfection facilities at other crossings appear to be in development.

May 6, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun— Satellite imagery supports open-source reporting that the North Korea-China border has likely been closed to trade since January 2020 due to the North Korean government’s precautions against the transmission of the Covid-19 virus. However, a recent increase in the volume of rail cars in the Dandong and Sinuiju Customs areas, as well as the removal of protective coverings at the Sinuiju rail terminal and freight yard (between March 31 and April 1), suggest preparations to resume exports to China that would provide North Korea with some hard currency.

March 17, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, Marie DuMond, Jonathan E. Hillman and Maesea McCalpin— Although significant political barriers remain to reconnecting the Korean peninsula, there is merit in substantive study of the types of energy infrastructure connections that would best promote regional growth and stability. The cases examined in this report underscore North Korea’s dire need for energy infrastructure investment and the importance of it meeting the G20 quality infrastructure investment principles.

November 30, 2020, by Michelle Bigold, Minjung Chey and Duke Dukho Gim— Rajin holds considerable economic value, and its viability stems from its potential to act as a regional logistics hub linking the Chinese northeastern provinces, Far East Russia and North Korea. For China, the development of the northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin hinges on access to a seaport. Having long suffered from stagnated growth and brain drain, the region is further weighed down by inefficient transport options that continue to stymie its economic potential.

June 16, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha— The latest undertaking at the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex, one of North Korea’s oldest and largest chemical complexes, is the construction of a small “liquid nutrient fertilizer factory.” The construction and future operation of this new liquid nutrient fertilizer factory is a further manifestation of the continuing efforts under Kim Jong-un to increase agricultural production by expanding and diversifying domestic fertilizer production capabilities.

November 19, 2019, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Marie DuMond— Antiquated facilities, equipment, and processes, together with the continual plague of electricity shortages, will hinder any dramatic production increases of magnesite at North Korea's Taehung Youth Hero Mine... The Taehung Youth Hero Mine "has established the Juche orientation in the production of fireproof…

August 16, 2019, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha— Ryongyang Mine is the largest magnesite mine in North Korea and one of the largest in the world. However, satellite and ground imagery show the infrastructure and technology in use at the mines is dated and obsolete when compared to world standards.

September 19, 2018, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Marie DuMond— Enforcement of international sanctions on North Korean seafood should be expected, therefore, to have an impact on both North Korea’s baseline fisheries earnings and the expected future return on the regime’s investment of resources and strategic effort in this modernization project.