Failed Launch and Damage of the Second Guided Missile Destroyer

Key Findings

• On May 21, North Korea held a launching ceremony of a “newly-built 5000-tonnage destroyer,” assessed to be the second Choe Hyon-class guided missile destroyer (DDGHM), at Chongjin. However, North Korean media reported on the failure of the launching which has led to significant damage to the vessel.   
• Satellite imagery acquired on May 22, 2025, confirms this report. The stern is seen swung out into the harbor as a result of the wheeled units placed under the frame sliding into the water while the bow remained on the side slipway.  
• Another contributing issue may have been the Hambuk Shipyard itself. As noted in our previous report, it was unusual that the shipyard was selected to undertake the construction of the second DDGHM. The shipyard has previously primarily produced cargo vessels, fishing vessels, and dredgers and undoubtedly lacks significant expertise in manufacturing and launching large warships such as the new destroyer.   
• The failed launch is an embarrassment to Kim Jong-un and North Korea’s Korean People’s Navy (KPN). The DDGHM will not be entering service anytime soon and may ultimately prove to be a complete loss. 
• This failure has undoubtedly disrupted Kim’s planned timeline for the development of the KPN from a coastal defense force into a nascent blue-water force capable of strategic offensive operations. 

Satellite imagery confirms North Korean media reports that the second Choe Hyon-class guided missile destroyer (DDGHM) was significantly damaged on May 21, 2025, during its launching ceremony at the Hambuk Shipyard in Chongjin’s O-hang harbor. Kim Jong-un was on hand to both observe the launch and witness the subsequent damage to the vessel.¹ Rodong Sinmun described the accident in these words:  

“Due to inexperienced command and operational carelessness in the course of the launch, the launch slide of the stern departed first and stranded as the bogie failed to move in parallel, holes made at some sections of the warship’s bottom disrupted its balance, and the bow failed to leave the slipway, leading to a serious accident.”²

Satellite imagery from May 22, 2025, corroborates Rodong Sinmun’s reporting. The bogies under the bow—wheeled units under the frame carrying the vessel as it slides into the water of the side slideway—apparently caught or fell off the rails resulting in the stern swinging out into the O-hang harbor while the bow remained on the side slipway.  

It is unclear if the crane and deck barges previously observed in satellite imagery on May 19 working along the shipyard’s side slideway had any connection to the failed launch. Had these barges been working on the side slideway’s rails and the work had not been undertaken with care and inspection; it may have been the root cause of the launching accident. It should also be noted that side slideway launching requires the vessel to have significant structural strength.   

Aside from the factors revolving around the side slideway, bogies, and rail, a contributing issue may have been the Hambuk shipyard itself. As noted in our previous report, it was unusual that the Hambuk Shipyard was selected to undertake the construction of the second DDGHM. During its lifetime, the shipyard has produced cargo vessels, fishing vessels, and dredgers primarily and only occasionally manufactured small submersible infiltration craft and patrol craft. As such, the shipyard undoubtedly lacks significant expertise in manufacturing and launching large warships such as the new destroyer.   

Kim’s reaction to the failed launch was swift and severe, as Rodong Sinmun states:  

“He seriously warned that the errors caused by the irresponsibility of the relevant officials of the Munitions Industry Department of the WPK Central Committee, the Mechanical Institute of the State Academy of Sciences, Kim Chaek University of Technology, the Central Ship Design Institute and other relevant units and the Chongjin Shipyard responsible for the accident that lowered the dignity and self-respect of our state in a moment would have to be dealt with at the plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee to be convened next month, and censured them for the fault.”³

The intensity of Kim’s reaction and orders for an investigation will undoubtedly affect the livelihood and families of numerous managers and employees at the shipyard and supporting organizations.  

How severe the damage to the vessel is, whether it is a total loss, how long it will take to repair, and how successful the overall salvage operation will be are yet unclear. Regardless, this second Choe Hyon-class DDGHM will not be entering Korean Peoples’ Navy (KPN) service anytime soon and may ultimately prove to be a complete loss. This delay in launching the vessel has undoubtedly disrupted Kim Jong-un’s planned timeline for the development of the KPN from a coastal defense force into a nascent blue-water force capable of strategic offensive operations.