February 18, 2021 Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun—
Commercial satellite imagery acquired on January 5, 2021 and February 7, 2021 indicate that the Yusang-ni missile base is operational and that minor development (i.e., construction, etc.) has continued since our last report from May 9, 2019... Commercial satellite imagery acquired on January 5, 2021 and February 7, 2021 indicate that the…
February 10, 2021 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
There are no visible indications of preparations for the launch of the much anticipated “newly built submarine”—North Korea’s first true ballistic missile submarine (SSB)... No significant activity was observed at the Sinpo South Shipyard in satellite imagery acquired on…
January 25, 2021 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
The Kyongje-dong facility was likely built to serve as a wartime forward operating base for MD-500s helicopters to support special force operations against South Korea during the early stages of a renewed conflict. Like a number of air facilities in North Korea, the Kyongje-dong facility appears to be in wartime reserve or caretaker status and is not associated with North Korea's ballistic missile operating bases.
December 24, 2020 Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha and Dana Kim—
Located approximately 52 kilometers north of the DMZ and 125 kilometers north of Seoul, the Kal-gol missile operating base is one of the most developed of North Korea’s approximately 15-20 undeclared ballistic missile facilities. This base likely houses a reinforced brigade-sized unit equipped with 500-kilometer-range Hwasong-6 (Scud C) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) or Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).
October 29, 2020 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
Latest observations of the Sinpo South Shipyard show a return to its status quo of low-level activity. Notable vessels and objects have returned to, or remain at, their usual positions... Latest observations of the Sinpo South Shipyard show a return to its status quo of…
October 5, 2020 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
With the upcoming Korean Workers’ Party Foundation Day celebration on October 10, a SLBM test should not be ruled out as a possibility for Kim Jong-un’s self-proclaimed “October surprise.” Such a test would be consistent with Beyond Parallel historical data that shows heightened provocations around U.S. presidential election years.
September 23, 2020 Victor Cha—
Over the course of 30 elections since 1956, Beyond Parallel measured the period of time before or after an election in which a North Korean provocation happens and found the provocation window has grown more narrow over time. That is, North Korean missile/nuclear tests and other major kinetic provocations have clustered increasingly closer to U.S. elections.
September 4, 2020 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
A satellite image of the Sinpo South Shipyard acquired on September 4, 2020 shows some activity within the secure boat basin that is suggestive, but not conclusive, of preparations for an upcoming test of a Pukguksong-3 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from the submersible test stand barge based here.
August 27, 2020 Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha and Bonny Lee—
The Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant represents a critical component of North Korea’s nuclear research and weapons development programs. Through analysis of 100+ medium- and high-resolution declassified and commercial satellite images, this report aims to provide a new and unique look into the facility. It is also the second publication in a series analyzing North Korea’s uranium concentrate plants as well as one of the most comprehensive collections of unclassified information and satellite imagery presently available of the Pyongsan facility.
June 16, 2020 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
The latest undertaking at the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex, one of North Korea’s oldest and largest chemical complexes, is the construction of a small “liquid nutrient fertilizer factory.” The construction and future operation of this new liquid nutrient fertilizer factory is a further manifestation of the continuing efforts under Kim Jong-un to increase agricultural production by expanding and diversifying domestic fertilizer production capabilities.