March 28, 2018 Victor Cha and Sue Mi Terry—
On March 25-28, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un traveled with his wife Ri Sol-ju to Beijing to meet Chinese president Xi Jinping. This was Kim Jong-un’s first foreign visit as the head of state and his first visit to China since becoming North Korea’s supreme leader in December 2011.
December 21, 2017 Joseph Bermudez and Lisa Collins—
In July and September 2017, unconfirmed reports circulated about dramatically fluctuating gasoline and diesel prices in North Korea. There were also reports that China was planning to suspend or limit fuel exports to North Korea. Analysis of satellite imagery from around this period indicates that a fuel suspension of any significant length does not appear to have affected Pyongyang.
December 5, 2017 Joseph Bermudez and Lisa Collins—
On November 24, 2017, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told reporters that the Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge will be closed temporarily in the “near future” for repairs. A detailed analysis of DigitalGlobe satellite imagery from November 24th shows no activity on the bridge—repair or otherwise.
December 4, 2017 Marie DuMond—
South Korea and the United States generally share similar estimations of China’s and Japan’s blind spots in a unification scenario. Both believe that Beijing has the most prominent blind spot on domestic stabilization and refugees, and that Japan shares similar concerns, suggesting that all four powers could prioritize law and order in a unification scenario.
November 13, 2017 Marie DuMond—
Beyond Parallel’s first-ever survey of expert assessments on unification-related issues indicate South Korea and the United States share the common view that domestic stabilization and unification costs constitute the most critical unification blind spots with a high degree of concern but low levels of knowledge for both countries.
October 18, 2017 Marie DuMond—
Domestic stabilization is the most critical issue with unification for South Korean officials and experts, registering the highest composite score (i.e., high level of concern and low level of knowledge). This means civil-military relations, law and order, and stability in the North represent the issues for which Koreans see great consequences for national interests, but for which they have little prior knowledge or understanding. Hence, it is the greatest potential “blind spot” of unification. Costs related to unification rank a close second for South Koreans, followed by refugees, nuclear weapons, and human rights.
October 2, 2017—
The debate over how to deal with North Korea’s nuclear program has been raging for nearly 25 years. In this study, CSIS Beyond Parallel collected information on negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea to shed light on the present nuclear dilemma.
August 25, 2017—
Kong Xuanyou is China’s new Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs. He replaces the retiring Wu Dawei, who had held the position since its creation in 2010 and led the Chinese delegation to the Six-Party Talks since August 2004. Kong is an experienced diplomat having worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China for 32 years.
August 9, 2017—
The objective of the Six Party Talks was to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem through multilateral negotiations. In this Living History interview, Ambassador Chun Yung-woo reflects upon his experience negotiating with the Americans, Chinese and North Koreans during the Six Party Talks and also discusses his later role as National Security Advisor to ROK President Lee Myung-bak.
July 19, 2017—
On June 30, 2017, His Excellency Moon Jae-in, President of the Republic of Korea, delivered a Global Leaders Forum address to a Washington D.C. foreign policy audience of more than 250 at CSIS headquarters. This occasion marked several firsts: President Moon's first foreign policy address abroad, his first visit to the United States as president, and his first summit meeting with the Donald J. Trump administration.