December 5, 2017 Joseph Bermudez and Lisa Collins—
On November 24, 2017, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told reporters that the Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge will be closed temporarily in the “near future” for repairs. A detailed analysis of DigitalGlobe satellite imagery from November 24th shows no activity on the bridge—repair or otherwise.
December 4, 2017 Marie DuMond—
South Korea and the United States generally share similar estimations of China’s and Japan’s blind spots in a unification scenario. Both believe that Beijing has the most prominent blind spot on domestic stabilization and refugees, and that Japan shares similar concerns, suggesting that all four powers could prioritize law and order in a unification scenario.
November 13, 2017 Marie DuMond—
Beyond Parallel’s first-ever survey of expert assessments on unification-related issues indicate South Korea and the United States share the common view that domestic stabilization and unification costs constitute the most critical unification blind spots with a high degree of concern but low levels of knowledge for both countries.
October 18, 2017 Marie DuMond—
Domestic stabilization is the most critical issue with unification for South Korean officials and experts, registering the highest composite score (i.e., high level of concern and low level of knowledge). This means civil-military relations, law and order, and stability in the North represent the issues for which Koreans see great consequences for national interests, but for which they have little prior knowledge or understanding. Hence, it is the greatest potential “blind spot” of unification. Costs related to unification rank a close second for South Koreans, followed by refugees, nuclear weapons, and human rights.
October 2, 2017—
The debate over how to deal with North Korea’s nuclear program has been raging for nearly 25 years. In this study, CSIS Beyond Parallel collected information on negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea to shed light on the present nuclear dilemma.
August 25, 2017—
Kong Xuanyou is China’s new Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs. He replaces the retiring Wu Dawei, who had held the position since its creation in 2010 and led the Chinese delegation to the Six-Party Talks since August 2004. Kong is an experienced diplomat having worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China for 32 years.
August 9, 2017—
The objective of the Six Party Talks was to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem through multilateral negotiations. In this Living History interview, Ambassador Chun Yung-woo reflects upon his experience negotiating with the Americans, Chinese and North Koreans during the Six Party Talks and also discusses his later role as National Security Advisor to ROK President Lee Myung-bak.
July 19, 2017—
On June 30, 2017, His Excellency Moon Jae-in, President of the Republic of Korea, delivered a Global Leaders Forum address to a Washington D.C. foreign policy audience of more than 250 at CSIS headquarters. This occasion marked several firsts: President Moon's first foreign policy address abroad, his first visit to the United States as president, and his first summit meeting with the Donald J. Trump administration.
June 26, 2017—
The ROK-U.S. Alliance has safeguarded peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. And today, our alliance covers a whole range of areas including security, economic, social and cultural dimensions. Geographically, the alliance extends beyond the Korean Peninsula, and is now going global.
June 26, 2017 Robert King—
The tragic death of Otto Warmbier has again raised the question of whether travel to North Korea ought to be prohibited by the United States government. Prohibiting travel by Americans to North Korea has been talked about for some time, primarily on Capitol Hill. Arguments for a travel ban are (1) to protect the safety and wellbeing of American citizens; and (2) travel is a source of hard currency for the Kim regime which goes to the “royal economy” for imported French cognac and luxury automobiles for the young leader, as well as to fund nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.