February 18, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun— Commercial satellite imagery acquired on January 5, 2021 and February 7, 2021 indicate that the Yusang-ni missile base is operational and that minor development (i.e., construction, etc.) has continued since our last report from May 9, 2019... Commercial satellite imagery acquired on January 5, 2021 and February 7, 2021 indicate that the…

February 10, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha— There are no visible indications of preparations for the launch of the much anticipated “newly built submarine”—North Korea’s first true ballistic missile submarine (SSB). No significant activity is observed in satellite imagery of the Sinpo South Shipyard collected during the past several months. Typical of this is an image acquired on February 3, 2021.

January 25, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha— The Kyongje-dong facility was likely built to serve as a wartime forward operating base for MD-500s helicopters to support special force operations against South Korea during the early stages of a renewed conflict. Like a number of air facilities in North Korea, the Kyongje-dong facility appears to be in wartime reserve or caretaker status and is not associated with North Korea's ballistic missile operating bases.

December 24, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Dana Kim— Located approximately 52 kilometers north of the DMZ and 125 kilometers north of Seoul, the Kal-gol missile operating base is one of the most developed of North Korea’s approximately 15-20 undeclared ballistic missile facilities. This base likely houses a reinforced brigade-sized unit equipped with 500-kilometer-range Hwasong-6 (Scud C) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) or Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).

November 5, 2020, by Markus V. Garlauskas— If unchecked, North Korea is increasingly likely to resume strategic weapons testing in the months ahead—including tests of the technologies necessary for its missiles to carry multiple nuclear-capable reentry vehicles (RVs). Such missiles would, at a minimum, increase Pyongyang’s ability to challenge U.S. missile defenses, to make the most of its limited resources for strategic weapons production, and to threaten U.S. targets more credibly despite its limited flight testing of RVs.

October 29, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha— Latest observations of the Sinpo South Shipyard show a return to its status quo of low-level activity. Notable vessels and objects have returned to, or remain at, their usual positions. A satellite image of the Sinpo South Shipyard acquired on October 27, 2020 shows a return to what has become typical activity within the facility’s secure boat basin.

October 5, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha— With the upcoming Korean Workers’ Party Foundation Day celebration on October 10, a SLBM test should not be ruled out as a possibility for Kim Jong-un’s self-proclaimed “October surprise.” Such a test would be consistent with Beyond Parallel historical data that shows heightened provocations around U.S. presidential election years.

September 23, 2020, by Victor Cha— Over the course of 30 elections since 1956, Beyond Parallel measured the period of time before or after an election in which a North Korean provocation happens and found the provocation window has grown more narrow over time. That is, North Korean missile/nuclear tests and other major kinetic provocations have clustered increasingly closer to U.S. elections.

September 9, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.— An unidentified approximately 12-meter-by-1.75-meter yellow trailer or truck is on the same dock but immediately outside the secure boast basin. Speculation is that this may be a piece of construction equipment (e.g., a crane) or trailer transporting a missile container. We must reiterate that the resolution of the current image precludes positive identification so caution is urged.

September 8, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Dana Kim— The Hungnam Fertilizer Complex has long been associated with producing chemical feed stocks or agents for North Korea’s nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs. Any modernization or improvement in its production capacities warrant close monitoring as they have the potential to support or augment WMD capabilities.