Changes at North Korean Missile Operating Bases: Part 1

Key Findings

• During the past five years, North Korea has undertaken numerous small and some significant changes at most of its ballistic missile operating bases. 
• North Korea is not known to have ever made specific references to the existence of any of the ballistic missile operating bases identified in this report, which include the Hoejung-ni Missile Operating Base, the Kal-gol Missile Operating Base, and the Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base. 
• These bases are among approximately 15-20 known ballistic missile operating bases and ballistic missile support facilities that have never been declared by North Korea. 
• Many of the observed changes have focused on replacing outdated housing and improving food availability, indicating a concerted effort to continue improving the quality of life and morale of the Strategic Force troops and their families. 
• These developments are a component of Kim Jong-un’s ongoing efforts to elevate the Strategic Force’s status and improve readiness, as well as a concerted effort to continue improving the quality of life and morale of the troops and their families. 

Introduction

During the past five years, North Korea has undertaken numerous small and some significant changes at many of its missile operating bases. While in isolation, many of these changes appear to be what would typically be expected to be seen at large North Korean military facilities. However, the timing and nature of these developments across multiple ballistic missile operating bases indicate that they are a component of Kim Jong-un’s ongoing efforts to elevate the Strategic Force’s status and improve its readiness. Many of the observed changes have focused on replacing outdated housing and improving food availability, indicating a concerted effort to continue improving the quality of life and morale of the Strategic Force troops and their families. 

Hoejung-ni Missile Operating Base

The Hoejung-ni (회중리) Missile Operating Base is located approximately 338 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone and only 25 kilometers from the Chinese border in Chagang Province. It, along with several other northern missile operating bases, forms North Korea’s rear (or strategic) ballistic missile belt.¹

Hoejung-ni is one of the more recently completed missile operating bases, having begun construction in about 2003 and being essentially complete in about 2021. As such, significant changes during the two years since our previous report on the base were not anticipated. Satellite imagery collected during the intervening years has generally proven this to be correct—with one significant exception. 

The headquarters area has seen some minor changes, including the addition of landscaping, razing of one building, and the addition of several monuments. The nearby hardened drive-through missile checkout facility (with two bunkers) and various support activities remain essentially unchanged. A minor change is noted in the narrow branch valley approximately 250 meters past the drive-through facility that heads southwest to the southern entrance of the first underground facility. Just past this entrance, three small buildings, previously assessed as a sawmill, were razed sometime in October 2023.  

The one significant development at the base is that sometime around August 2023, construction began on a large, approximately 18 x 20-meter irregularly shaped building located directly across the river from the entrance to the second underground facility (UGF) and the access bridge to it. Although it remains to be confirmed, some additional work may have been undertaken on the portal to the UGF. As noted in our original report there are several unorthodox aspects to the construction of this UGF and its location across a river. These and other aspects are now associated with the new building. A final determination as to the intended function of both this UGF and the new building remains elusive. 

Notably, no pads like those observed at the Kal-gol Missile Operating Base and used for the training of missile crews with their TELs were observed at the Hoejung-ni Missile Operating Base. 

Kal-gol Missile Operating Base

The Kal-gol (갈골) Missile Operating Base is located approximately 52 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone and 125 kilometers north of Seoul in South Hwanghae Province. It, along with the bases at Kumchon-ni and Sakkanmol, forms North Korea’s forward (or tactical) ballistic missile belt. 

During the four years since our previous report on the base, a number of both significant and minor changes have taken place. The minor changes are typical of those observed at other large military facilities in rural areas (e.g., the razing of small structures, expansion of existing buildings, changes in agricultural support activities, etc.). Many of the more significant changes have focused on improving the troops’ and their families’ quality of life by replacing outdated housing and efforts to improve food availability. Adding training launch pads indicates an effort to improve training and operational readiness.   

Moving east up the valley where the base is located, sometime in May 2023 the main entrance and checkpoint consisting of a guard post and a small building were razed. These were replaced by two larger buildings located slightly to the east with a partially walled-in parking area. Sometime between September and October 2023, the existing bridge 100 meters west of the new entrance and checkpoint was replaced by a more substantial concrete bridge capable of supporting heavier loads and traffic. No changes of significance were observed at the specialized drive-through TEL support building used for maintenance and training at Oya-dong. This structure measures approximately 31 meters by 11 meters with an arched clearstory and appears well maintained. This clearstory is high enough to elevate most short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles in the North Korean inventory. 

Beginning in late 2021 and continuing through 2024, a major project was undertaken to raze, rebuild, and consolidate almost all the housing units in the areas around the villages of Oya-dong and Kal-gol, northwest of the headquarters area. This project began in late 2021 with the three housing areas 1.4 to 2.0 kilometers northwest of the headquarters area. In stages, this would see the razing of all three housing areas (two south and one north of the main access road) and the construction of new, more modern housing. As of January 16, 2024, two of the housing areas have been rebuilt, and the third will likely be rebuilt this year. Between January and November 2022, a small housing area was razed 450 meters west of the main headquarters area. Concurrently, half of a second older housing area immediately west of the main headquarters area was razed, leaving only six renovated structures. Finally, beginning during fall 2022, what appears to be a livestock facility located 800 meters west of the main headquarters area began to be enlarged. This appears to have been completed by the fall of 2023.   

Significantly, sometime between November 5 and November 26, 2022, five roughly semicircular 31-meter-by-20-meter graded areas were excavated along a 900-1,300-meter section of the main access road to the facility west of the headquarters area. Given their size, location, and timing of their appearance, it is believed that these clearings were pads used for training missile crews with their TELs during the winter training cycle. It should be noted that November 2022 was a remarkable month for North Korean missile testing, with one of the largest monthly number of missiles being launched. 

East of the headquarters area and within the hardened drive-through missile checkout facility (with two bunkers), a small structure was added sometime between November 25, 2022, and January 16, 2024. The purpose of this structure is unclear. 

Nothing of significance was observed at any of the UGF entrances in the base, including those at the east end up the valley. 

Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base

The Kumchon-ni (금천리) Missile Operating Base is located approximately 1,100 kilometers west of Tokyo and 69 kilometers northeast of the demilitarized zone in Kangwon Province. It, along with the bases at Kal-gol and Sakkanmol, forms North Korea’s forward (or tactical) ballistic missile belt.   

The Kumchon-ni is one of North Korea’s older missile operating bases with construction beginning sometime between 1991 and 1993. As a well-established facility, significant changes during the four-and-a-half years since our previous report on the base were not anticipated. Satellite imagery collected during the intervening years has proven this to be correct. The minor changes observed at Kumchon-ni follow the trend observed at other missile operating bases, focusing on improving the quality of life of troops and their families by replacing outdated housing and efforts to improve food availability. This, by extension, is viewed as an effort to improve morale and operational readiness among Strategic Force units. 

Moving east up the valley in which the base is located, several changes are observed. Between May 2022 and May 2023, the main access road was rerouted over a newly built concrete deck bridge and paved road between the main entrance and the security barracks approximately 300 meters to the east due to river flooding. A construction project to build nine new housing structures that began in 2022 was nearing completion. 200 to 500 meters to the east of these new housing structures were what appeared to be a new warehouse-type structure, and several housing units were built. Further east, in the center of the base in the headquarters and administration area, a single building was added between 2022 and 2024. Only very minor changes were observed elsewhere at the base. 

Notably, no pads like those observed at the Kal-gol Missile Operating Base that are used for training missile crews with their TELs were observed at Kumchon-ni. However, east of the headquarters area is a barracks area with two apparent small UGF entrances and a small, specialized TEL support building used for maintenance and training. This small high-bay structure, measuring 18 meters by 10 meters, with 5-meter-wide bay doors, a sloped roof, and no clearstory, is large enough to house a TEL and raise the launch rail to a vertical position. While similar to the one at Kal-gol, its size indicates that it is not as capable and is tall enough to only allow for the elevation of short-range ballistic missiles on a TEL. Although some larger systems could be serviced here, it is unlikely they could be elevated to full height. 

Nothing of significance was observed at any of the UGF entrances further up the valley to the east. While Kumchon-ni’s hardened drive-through missile checkout facility (with two bunkers) is partially obscured by the shadows of trees, it appears that nothing of significance has recently changed.