Dramatic Increase in DPRK-Russia Border Rail Traffic After Kim-Putin Summit

Key Findings

• Satellite imagery of North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility at the border with Russia captured on October 5, 2023, shows an unprecedented number of freight railcars, totaling approximately 73 railcars.  
• The level of rail traffic is far greater than what Beyond Parallel has observed at the facility during the past five years, even compared to pre-Covid-19 levels.  Given that Kim and Putin discussed some military exchanges and cooperation at their recent summit, the dramatic increase in rail traffic likely indicates North Korea’s supply of arms and munitions to Russia. However, the extensive use of tarps to cover the shipping crates/containers and equipment makes it impossible to conclusively identify what is seen at the Tumangang Rail Facility. 
• Developments elsewhere at the Tumangang Rail Facility indicate that North Korea is not simply planning to resume border traffic to pre-Covid-19 levels, but further expand the facility’s capacity at this border crossing.  
• Military transfers between the two countries would violate multiple UN Security Council resolutions and be subject to additional sanctions by the United States and its allies.  

In the aftermath of the Kim-Putin summit, satellite images as of October 5, 2023, captured a dramatic and unprecedented level of freight railcar traffic at North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility located on the North Korea-Russia border. In light of a U.S. government official’s statement yesterday that North Korea has begun transferring artillery to Russia, it is probable that these shipments are to support Russia in its war with Ukraine.¹ 

Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia took place last month from September 12 to 17. During his trip, he met Putin at the Vostochny Spaceport, then visited production sites for military aircraft at Komsomolsk-on-Amur, viewed Russia’s latest warplanes and hypersonic missile system, and inspected the Russian Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok.²

Previous talks concerning North Korean-Russian cooperation have centered around arms for food and energy. However, Kim’s unusual itinerary during the recent summit hints at Russian willingness to assist North Korea with satellite and space-launched vehicle technology, which could include ICBM technology.³ While no explicit statements to this effect were made, many believe that North Korea will provide additional munitions to aid Russia in its ongoing war with Ukraine. U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller confirmed that there is “reason to believe they were going to discuss military transfers.”⁴ He added that regardless of the direction of military exchange, the United States “will not hesitate to impose sanctions if and when it’s appropriate.”⁵

Unprecedented Level of Activity at Tumangang

Satellite imagery shows that starting five days after the summit, there has been a gradual but steady increase in the number of freight boxcars at North Korea’s Tumangang Rail Facility located on the North Korea-Russia border. The facility was where five Russian railcars from Khasan were seen on November 18, 2022, when the White House confirmed that North Korea was supplying arms to Russia’s Wagner Group. 

High-resolution satellite imagery captured on October 5, 2023, shows an unprecedented number of boxcars, totaling approximately 73 railcars. A review of publicly available satellite images over the past five years shows approximately 20 railcars at this facility at most, less than a third of the number of railcars seen in the most recent image. 

In addition to the boxcars, shipping crates/containers and equipment are seen laid out in the open at the main warehouse area of the facility. Exactly what is being transported remains unclear, as it is covered. However, it is notable that the external characteristics of the crates/containers and equipment are different from those observed during the past five years at the facility. Given the same-day reporting that North Korea has begun transferring artillery to Russia, it is probable that these shipments are, or include, munitions and artillery.⁶ However, imagery alone cannot definitively conclude this, as the shipping crates/containers are covered. 

Lack of Activity at Khasan

Conversely, the level and type of rail activity at Russia’s Khasan Rail Facility are nowhere near as complex or industrial-related as that at Tumangang. However, it is too early to conclusively identify the direction of the railcars; additional images will be necessary to make such a determination.  

Elsewhere at Tumangang

Elsewhere at the Tumangang Rail Facility, ongoing construction for what appears to be a new warehouse facility is located approximately 350 meters northwest of the petroleum products loading/unloading facility. It is unlikely, however, that this construction is directly connected to the goods seen at the rail facility at this time.  

Additionally, the ongoing presence of concrete railroad ties and ballasting operations throughout the railyard over the past year indicates a concerted effort to both maintain and upgrade the facility supporting the movement of goods at this border crossing. Such work is an indication that North Korea is not simply planning for the resumption of border traffic to pre-Covid-19 levels, but to further expand the facility’s capacity. 

Complementing these developments has been the construction of a security wall with numerous guard positions encompassing the warehouse facility and southern section of the railyard during the past two years. This activity is likely both part of North Korea’s efforts to strictly control population movements and preparations to handle sensitive goods at the border as the country seeks to strengthen its ties with Russia.