Indications of Delayed Second Reconnaissance Satellite Launch at Sohae

Key Findings

• North Korea has reportedly been preparing to launch its second reconnaissance satellite as part of its goal this year to launch three more after the first successful launch in November 2023. 
• Movement observed at the VIP Observation Facility and the Administration and Security Headquarters suggests that a satellite launch was planned but was canceled for unknown reasons. 
• South Korean government officials stated although the launch was originally anticipated to happen around April 15, coinciding with Kim Il-sung’s birthday, it is assessed to have been delayed for technical improvements. 
• The launch is expected soon, potentially within days or by the end of April at the latest. 
• Any reconnaissance satellite launch involves the use of domestically developed or covertly acquired ballistic missile technology, which is currently banned by the UN and would be a violation of existing UNSC resolutions.  
• North Korea’s second satellite launch, which will come in the wake of Russia’s recent veto of the UN resolution renewing the panel of experts, would be the latest evidence of the ongoing military technology cooperation between North Korea and Russia.  

Shortly after the successful launch of its first reconnaissance satellite, the Malligyong-1, on November 23, 2023, North Korea announced plans to launch three additional reconnaissance satellites.¹

In late March 2024, unnamed South Korean military officials reportedly claimed that “after completing performance checks through propellant combustion tests, propellants were moved” to the Sohae Satellite Launching Station.² Further supporting these claims, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) spokesperson told reporters on March 26 that “indications of North Korea preparing for the additional launch of a military reconnaissance satellite continue to be detected.”³ A satellite image around this time showed the laying of light blue ground cloths on the coastal launch pad, increasing speculation of an imminent launch.⁴

However, despite increasing interest and visible changes at Sohae, the ROK JCS spokesperson clarified on April 1 that there is “no indication of imminent plans for a launch.”⁵ On April 14, the South Korean defense minister stated that while the satellite launch was initially anticipated for some time around April 15, coinciding with Kim Il-sung’s birthday, it is now believed to be postponed due to the need for technical enhancements. Nevertheless, he maintained that the launch could be expected soon, potentially within days, or by the end of April at the latest.⁶

Most recent cloud-free satellite images of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, captured on April 8 and April 10, show the developments at the station in the days between the April 1 JCS statement and the April 14 statement by the defense minister. The two images do not show any clear and obvious evidence of an imminent test. However, movement observed at the VIP Observation Facility and the Administration and Security Headquarters suggest that a satellite launch was planned but unexpectedly cancelled for unknown reasons. 

VIP Observation Facility

An April 8, 2024, satellite image shows the presence of three vehicles at the VIP Observation Facility, a site frequented by Kim Jong-un for watching launches and engine tests. As noted in our previous report, this area typically hosts communication, broadcast, and telemetry/tracking vehicles in the days leading up to such events. The recent vehicle activity suggests North Korea initially planned for a launch around this time. Yet, by April 10, the area was reduced to a single vehicle, potentially for tracking. The lingering presence of this vehicle implies that while the launch has been postponed, preparations continue for an anticipated launch in the near future.

Administration and Security Headquarters

Another indicator of potential launch preparations is the ten vehicles present in the courtyard of the administration and security headquarters. It is uncommon for this courtyard to be so populated, and such a concentration of vehicles has historically coincided with past test launches at Sohae. By April 10, these vehicles were no longer present, further supporting the assessment that the launch had been postponed due to yet unknown reasons.

Elsewhere at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station

At the coastal launch pad, where the launch of the Malligyong-1 occurred and the next launch is believed to be taking place, there are no indicators of an imminent launch in images captured on April 8 and 10. The blue ground cloths laid out on the pad identified in late March were removed a few days later.

At the Yunsong Horizontal Engine Test Stand, where Kim Jong-un oversaw a solid-fuel engine test for a “new-type intermediate-range hypersonic missile” in March, the exhaust scarring is still visible in the April 8 and 10 images.

Other locations throughout the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, such as the original launch pad and the Yunsong Vertical Engine Test Stand, did not show any changes or indicators of significance in the studied images.