March 26, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Dana Kim—
Commercial satellite imagery collected during the past eight months indicates that despite the absence of any nuclear testing by North Korea since 2017, the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant remains operational, is producing uranium concentrate (U3O8, “yellowcake”), and continues to be updated. Yellowcake can be enriched to become highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used to produce nuclear weapons.
March 25, 2021, by Victor Cha—
“It’s business as usual” as North Korea appears to be resuming its cycle of provocations, using weapons demonstrations to build leverage and as a pressure tactic to force unilateral concessions from the United States for a return to the negotiating table.
March 19, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha—
Minor activity is observed near the static test stand and the nearby Sinpo Shipyard’s graving dock in satellite imagery acquired on acquired on March 11, 2021. There are no indications of preparations of a forthcoming “pop-up” test of a submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); however, the North could launch the new SSB or conduct additional SLBM tests at any time of its choosing.
March 17, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, Marie DuMond, Jonathan E. Hillman and Maesea McCalpin—
Although significant political barriers remain to reconnecting the Korean peninsula, there is merit in substantive study of the types of energy infrastructure connections that would best promote regional growth and stability. The cases examined in this report underscore North Korea’s dire need for energy infrastructure investment and the importance of it meeting the G20 quality infrastructure investment principles.
February 18, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun—
Commercial satellite imagery acquired on January 5, 2021 and February 7, 2021 indicate that the Yusang-ni missile base is operational and that minor development (i.e., construction, etc.) has continued since our last report from May 9, 2019... Commercial satellite imagery acquired on January 5, 2021 and February 7, 2021 indicate that the…
February 10, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha—
There are no visible indications of preparations for the launch of the much anticipated “newly built submarine”—North Korea’s first true ballistic missile submarine (SSB). No significant activity is observed in satellite imagery of the Sinpo South Shipyard collected during the past several months. Typical of this is an image acquired on February 3, 2021.
January 25, 2021, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha—
The Kyongje-dong facility was likely built to serve as a wartime forward operating base for MD-500s helicopters to support special force operations against South Korea during the early stages of a renewed conflict. Like a number of air facilities in North Korea, the Kyongje-dong facility appears to be in wartime reserve or caretaker status and is not associated with North Korea's ballistic missile operating bases.
December 24, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Dana Kim—
Located approximately 52 kilometers north of the DMZ and 125 kilometers north of Seoul, the Kal-gol missile operating base is one of the most developed of North Korea’s approximately 15-20 undeclared ballistic missile facilities. This base likely houses a reinforced brigade-sized unit equipped with 500-kilometer-range Hwasong-6 (Scud C) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) or Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).
October 29, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha—
Latest observations of the Sinpo South Shipyard show a return to its status quo of low-level activity. Notable vessels and objects have returned to, or remain at, their usual positions. A satellite image of the Sinpo South Shipyard acquired on October 27, 2020 shows a return to what has become typical activity within the facility’s secure boat basin.
October 5, 2020, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Victor Cha—
With the upcoming Korean Workers’ Party Foundation Day celebration on October 10, a SLBM test should not be ruled out as a possibility for Kim Jong-un’s self-proclaimed “October surprise.” Such a test would be consistent with Beyond Parallel historical data that shows heightened provocations around U.S. presidential election years.
