Recent Developments Along the China-North Korea Border

Key Findings

• The North Korea-China border crossing at Sinuiju-Dandong is an immensely important trade point for North Korea as it is the country’s primary access point to its northern neighbor. Although activity at this border had dramatically decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic, by November 2023, truck traffic significantly increased, and by mid-2024, satellite imagery showed consistently high levels of trade activity at key customs yards in both China and North Korea.
• Recent expert analysis suggests that China-DPRK trade has not yet returned to pre-pandemic levels.  However, satellite images from November 2023 to July 2024 show that high levels of truck traffic were regularly observed at these locations. This, combined with activity at the Uiju Disinfection/Rail Transfer Facility, indicates that trade between the two countries is in the process of recovering to pre-pandemic volume.
• This restoration of trade at the Sinuiju-Dandong border was upended when unusually heavy rains struck northwestern North Korea in late July 2024. While the flooding did not significantly damage the Uiju Disinfection/Rail Transfer Facility itself, the flood waters did submerge and damage many of the rail lines in the area. Satellite imagery shows that during the second week of August 2024, North Korea started dismantling the Uiju Disinfection/Rail Transfer Facility.
• Whether the dismantlement of the Uiju Disinfection/Rail Transfer Facility was a response to flood-related damage or some previous post-COVID strategic decision to once again allow Chinese-related rail traffic to proceed more directly to North Korean industries and rail yards throughout North Korea is yet unknown.

The North Korea-China border crossing at Sinuiju-Dandong is an immensely important trade point for North Korea as it is the country’s primary access point to its northern neighbor. As of 2023, North Korea’s trade with China, which primarily occurs at this location by rail and truck, accounts for 98.3% of the country’s official trade volume.¹

Activity at this border dramatically decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic, when North Korea locked down its northern border. North Korea prioritized finding alternative ways to continue importing some goods, as evidenced by the conversion of the Uiju Airbase into a disinfection and rail transfer facility in 2021.  Low levels of trade continued throughout, and experts assess that bilateral trade has not yet reached pre-COVID levels (2018-2019) in 2023 and the first half of 2024 (while that between the DPRK and Russia has grown exponentially).

Satellite imagery also indicates that DPRK-China trade levels have been gradually increasing but have yet to return to pre-COVID levels and were expected to return to those levels soon, barring unforeseen developments. The level of truck traffic at the rail and customs yard in Dandong, China, and at the customs and truck transfer yards in Sinuiju, North Korea, noticeably increased by November 2023.² Since then, satellite images from January to July 2024 show that high levels of truck traffic were regularly observed at these locations. Additionally, large numbers of shipping containers and tarp-covered goods were continuously present at the Uiju Disinfection/Rail Transfer Facility. Such activity indicated that trade between the two countries was in the process of recovering to pre-pandemic volume.³ Notably, the traffic was consistent even in the weeks before and after President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in June 2024.

However, this restoration of trade at the Sinuiju-Dandong border was upended when unusually heavy rains struck northwestern North Korea in late July 2024. The rains resulted in extensive flooding and damage in and around the greater Sinuiju area that destroyed housing and industries, displaced thousands, and disrupted road and rail trade between China and North Korea.⁴ Normalized Difference Water Index (NDWI) analysis of the flooded area highlights the dramatic expansion of the Yalu River.⁵

While the heavy flooding did not significantly damage the Uiju Disinfection/Rail Transfer Facility itself, it did submerge and damage many of the rail lines in the area. Much of this damage occurred when flood waters overwhelmed small culverts and rail trestles or washed away rail ballast (rock placed between and on the sides of the track) that supported the embankments the rail lines were built upon. This damage reportedly led to a greater dependence upon truck transportation and resulted in an increase in the volume of truck movements observed in the area.⁶

Satellite imagery shows that during the second week of August 2024, the first signs of what has turned out to be a larger dismantlement project for the Uiju Disinfection/Rail Transfer Facility began.

The initial phases of the dismantlement project witnessed the removal of shipping containers and tarp-covered goods stored out in the open. This included the removal of goods stored in the various warehouses throughout the facility. This was followed by dismantling a structure in the southeast section of the facility and was quickly followed by the dismantlement of most other structures. As of September 8, 2024, all open storage and shipping containers have been removed and about 95% of the structures within the facility have been dismantled and removed. One notable exception to this is the five concrete loading/unloading docks, which have yet to be broken up.

Interestingly, the facility’s structures were not razed in the sense of simply being knocked down by heavy construction equipment, but rather were dismantled with the roofs and supporting framework being first disassembled and removed—apparently to be used elsewhere; only then the walls were knocked down and rubble largely removed.

Whether the dismantlement of the Uiju Disinfection/Rail Transfer Facility was a response to flood-related damage or some previous post-COVID strategic decision to once again allow Chinese-related rail traffic to proceed more directly to North Korean industries and rail yards throughout North Korea is yet unknown.

At present, there are early indications that North Korea is in the early stages of restoring the facility to an operational airbase.⁷ It should be noted that a majority of the headquarters, maintenance, support, and housing areas of the original airbase were not impacted by the earlier conversion to a disinfection/rail transfer facility.