Military

Undeclared North Korea: The Yongnim Missile Operating Base

A close-up view of the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, May 13, 2002 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Key Findings

  • Located 242 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone and only 65 kilometers from the Chinese border, the Yongnim Missile Operating Base is an undeclared ballistic missile operating base in Chagang Province. The base is one of approximately 15-20 operational or abandoned ballistic missile operating bases, the subjects of ongoing study by CSIS that have never been declared by the North Korean government. The Yongnim base likely houses a regiment or brigade-sized unit equipped with intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). This is the first in-depth open-source study confirming the base. 
  • As one of the early components of North Korea’s strategic missile belt, the Yongnim Missile Operating Base represents a foundational element in North Korea’s extensive and growing nationwide dispersed ballistic missile network and a critical component of its strategic offensive and deterrence force.  
  • Construction began approximately 30 years ago and suggests a considerable level of prior development planning that is rarely appreciated and was likely linked to projected IRBM and ICBM developments and projected basing requirements. 
  • North Korea is not known to have ever made specific references to the existence of the Yongnim Missile Operating Base or the unit based here. Additionally, it does not appear to have been the subject of any denuclearization negotiations previously conducted between the United States and North Korea.  

The Yongnim (용림) Missile Operating Base is located in Chonchon-gun (전천군, Chonchon County), Chagang-do (자강도, Chagang Province), 170 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang, 242 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone, 324 kilometers northeast of Seoul and 1,284 kilometers northwest of Tokyo.1

Construction of the Yongnim base is believed to have been undertaken by the Military Construction Bureau and is reported to have commenced sometime around 1994—at approximately the same time as that for the ballistic missile operating bases at Yongjo-ri and Sangnam-ni.2 The fact that construction of the base began so long ago suggests a considerable level of development planning that is rarely appreciated and was likely linked to projected IRBM and ICBM developments and projected basing requirements. The location chosen for the new base is within a small valley approximately 14 km southwest of Yongnim-up—from which it received its provisional name.

The overall layout and design of the Yongnim base are somewhat similar to that of the Sangnam-ni missile operating base, with the base headquarters, administration, and barracks areas being located at the beginning of a narrow valley and the hardened drive-through missile checkout and entrances to underground facilities at the upper end of the valley.

The location and timing of the construction of the Yongnim missile operating base suggest that it was an early component of North Korea’s development of its strategic or rear ballistic missile belt. This missile belt is a component of an extensive and growing nationwide dispersed ballistic missile network subordinate to the Strategic Force—the Korean People’s Army (KPA) organization responsible for all long-range ballistic missile units.

North Korea is not known to have ever made specific references to the existence of the Yongnim missile operating base or the unit based here.3 Therefore, the national designators for both are unknown.4 The provisional title of Yongnim missile operating base is derived from its location approximately 14 km southwest of the town of Yongnim-up.

Satellite imagery as of October 3, 2024, indicates that the Yongnim Missile Operating Base likely houses a regiment to brigade-sized missile unit. The base is active and relatively well-maintained by North Korean standards, and minor infrastructure developments have been ongoing over the past 20 years.

Base Organization

The Yongnim Missile Operating Base (40.483324 126.501814) encompasses approximately 19 square kilometers within the upper reaches of a remote wooded mountain valley situated between the eastern slopes of Paek-san (백산, Paek Mountain) and the western slopes of Chikkol-san (직골산). The base encompasses the six small named villages of Chongjagye (청자계), Kosu-dong (거수동), Kupawon (구파원), Sagaegol (사개골), Simnipyong (십리평), and Sinsang-dong (신상동). Prior to the commencement of base construction, all these villages were involved in small agricultural activities before being incorporated into the base. A small meandering stream, the Hwangrinchon (황린천), bisects the main valley and serves as a tributary to the larger Hwagyongchon (화경천). Most of the area encompassed by the base consists of unoccupied tree-covered mountains and a few small agricultural and forestry activities that likely now support the base.

Satellite imagery indicates that the base can be functionally divided into five general activities: entrance/checkpoint; headquarters, administration, and housing; hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities; underground facilities; and a variety of small housing, support, and agricultural support activities.

Overview of the Yongnim Missile Operating Base, June 13, 2024 (Copyright © 2024 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

The base facilities themselves begin about midway up the valley from what appears to be a checkpoint/security compound north of the village of Kupawon and extend southeast approximately 10 kilometers past the headquarters in the Kupawon-Simnipyong area, various support facilities, two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, four small and one large underground facility (UGF) entrances and ending south of the village of Chongjagye.

East of Simnipyong, a small valley branches off, extending approximately 10 kilometers to the east and the logging village of Sinsang-dong. The two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities are located approximately 3.2 kilometers southeast of Simnipyong. Immediately south of them a small branch valley extends off to the southwest. Here a small bridge crosses the stream and leads to four small entrances to an underground facility.

Located outside and to the northwest of the base along the valley are the villages of Yanghap (양합) and Won-dong (원동). The village of Won-dong appears to have a small KPA ground forces base with an associated light air defense artillery (ADA) battery position. Further north and on the opposite (north) side of the Chongchon-gang is the town of Riman-ri (리만리) and the Riman Rail Station (Riman-yok, 리만역). The latter likely provides some level of support to the base.

Approximately 17 kilometers to the north is the February 8 General Machine Factory, which has been associated with ballistic missile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) production/modification in the past.5 This facility likely provides some level of support to the unit based at the Yongnim base. Under the most ideal conditions, the light ADA battery near Won-dong could provide minimal air defense for the Yongnim base. A surface-to-air (SAM) missile unit based at the February 8 General Machine Factory is equipped with S-75 Dvina (NATO: SA-2 Guideline) missiles that can provide air defense coverage for the Yongnim base. There are no airbases within 50 kilometers. There appear to be two small checkpoints/entrances along the valley. The first is located approximately 700 meters north of Yanghap (40.526462 126.438176) and is likely a general position for the entire valley and what is believed to be the entrance/checkpoint (40.498425 126.474844) for the Yongnim Ballistic Missile Base itself is located further up the valley approximately 2 kilometers north of Kupawon.

The entrance/checkpoint for the Yongnim Missile Operating Base, September 6, 2023 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.]

A single building has been present at the latter since approximately 2002. Sometime between 2008 and 2014, this building was razed, and a small compound was built in its place consisting of four structures, including a barracks/administration type building and a motor vehicle storage building. No formal base entrance sign is present over the road at either of these entrances/checkpoints, although such signs are often seen at important KPA bases. On the hill southwest of Kupawon, at approximately 700 and 1,200 meters from the barracks compound, are what have been reported as bunkers. However, these appear to be the remains of several agricultural buildings that were previously razed, but this requires further investigation.

The base’s headquarters and administration areas are located approximately 9 kilometers up the valley (to the south) in the Kupawon-Sagaegol-Simnipyong (40.483514 126.501896) area and consist of approximately 125 small and medium-sized buildings (including two barracks compounds and several greenhouses) located on both sides of the Hwangrin-chon and a parade ground/soccer pitch. Its size and layout are somewhat similar to that seen at other missile operating bases.6 Immediately south of the area is a small agricultural support compound. In a small branch valley extending to the southwest from the headquarters and administration areas are several small support and agricultural support facilities. Between 2010 and 2014, several small isolated agricultural structures located here were razed. Since that time, no changes of significance have been observed here.

The headquarters, administration area, and support areas around Kupawon-Sagaegol-Simnipyong, May 13, 2002 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The headquarters, administration area, and support areas around Kupawon-Sagaegol-Simnipyong, September 6, 2023 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Approximately 800 meters east-southeast of the headquarters and administration area is a small barracks compound. From here, approximately 900 meters southeast is a deck bridge leading to a branch valley extending east to the village of Sinsang-dong (신상동). This village consists of approximately 15 small and medium structures, including what is believed to be a medium-sized motor vehicle maintenance and storage facility for logging vehicles and equipment.

The small barracks compound east-southeast of the headquarters and administration area, September 6, 2023 (Copyright © by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The deck bridge over the Hwangrin-chon that leads to the branch valley extending east to the village of Sinsang-dong, September 6, 2023 (Copyright © by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

The main valley extends approximately 6.3 kilometers south of the deck bridge past several support and barracks areas and ultimately to an agricultural support area 1 kilometer south of the village of Chongjagye. Notably, this section of the base includes five barracks and motor vehicle maintenance and support facilities, a small dam, two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, four small entrances to UGFs, a large entrance to what is likely the base’s main UGF, and several agricultural support facilities.

The support village and small dam 400 meters south of the deck bridge, September 24, 2024 (Copyright © by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The barracks compound and motor vehicle maintenance and storage facilities 1.4 kilometers south of the deck bridge, October 28, 2023 (Copyright © by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
The deck bridge immediately north of the hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, October 28, 2023 (Copyright © by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.]

Approximately three kilometers southeast of the headquarters and administration areas, on the west side of the Hwangrin-chon, are the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities (41.370204 126.912578 and 40.457947 126.520012). These are sometimes referred to as missile support facilities and are used for missile arming, fueling, systems checkout, and maintenance operations. Each facility consists of a large concrete reinforced shelter cut into the side of the adjacent mountain, measures approximately 19 meters long, has a 12-meter opening at each end, and is covered with soil with vegetation planted on top. The length and size of the openings are of sufficient size to accommodate all but the largest KPA ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), mobile-erector-launchers (MELs), transporter-erectors (TEs), and missile support vehicles and equipment. Available high-resolution satellite imagery suggests that these were built in the late-1990s. It should be noted that reported KPA wartime ballistic missile doctrine calls for launchers and support vehicles to exit the base to conduct launch operations.7 The maturing vegetation on top of each structure consisting of trees and bushes makes it increasingly challenging to locate these facilities using commercial satellite imagery in all but winter months, during which long shadows also provide a challenge.

A close-up view of the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, May 13, 2002 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
A later close-up of the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities undergoing repair, construction, or deception-related work, March 31, 2023 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
An October 28, 2023, view of the area containing the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities which are hidden by the trees and other vegetation planted above and around them (Copyright © 2024 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Approximately 250 meters south of these facilities and across a small stream feeding into the Hwangrin-chon are four small UGF entrances. A fifth and larger UGF entrance is located 2.6 kilometers further up the valley and on the west side of the Hwangrin-chon. This is likely the base’s primary UGF and, like the hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, appears to have been built during the late 1990s. Notably, none of the potential UGF entrances have the large, well-defined protective berms in front of them as are typically seen at other missile operating bases. Rather, it appears that spoil removed during the construction of the UGFs was piled outside the entrances in a somewhat casual manner.

A close-up view of the four small underground facility entrances just south of the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, May 13, 2002 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
An unobstructed view of the four small underground facility entrances just south of the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, March 31, 2023 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
A more recent view of the area with the four small underground facility entrances. All are hidden by the trees and other vegetation planted above and around them, October 28, 2023 (Copyright © 2024 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
A later unobstructed view of the large underground facility entrance located approximately 16 kilometers south-southeast of the headquarters and administration area, November 14, 2010 (Copyright © 2024 by Maxar). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.
A more recent view of the area containing the large underground facility entrance. It is completely hidden by the trees and vegetation planted above and around it, October 28, 2023 (Copyright © 2024 by Planet). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

To facilitate movement up the valley, there are eight bridges or fords across the Hwangrin-chon as it meanders back and forth.

As of October 24, 2024, the Yongnim Missile Operating Base is a mature missile operating base and is well-maintained by North Korean standards.

Order-of-Battle

As noted above, early sources have indicated that the KPA ballistic missile unit based at the Yongnim Ballistic Missile Operating Base is equipped with IRBMs. Given the layout and size of the infrastructure visible in satellite imagery, the Yongnim base likely houses a regiment or brigade-sized unit consisting of a headquarters, small service elements, and several firing batteries. There is insufficient open-source information to arrive at a reasonably accurate estimate of the number of firing batteries or launchers in this ballistic missile unit. However, it should be noted that the organizational structures of KPA ballistic missile units do not necessarily neatly fit into Western organizational structures. Additionally, it is reported that as production of ballistic missiles and TELs/MELs has continued during the past 15 years, North Korea has not necessarily increased the number of units subordinate to the Strategic Force; rather it has increased the number of firing batteries within existing units.8

Likewise, the type of missile housed at the Yongnim Missile Operating is also uncertain. In 2016, South Korean sources initially described that missile unit as being equipped with the Hwasong-7 (Nodong) or Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) MRBMs.9 A subsequent South Korean October 24, 2016, press report, citing intelligence sources, indicated that North Korea had deployed the Hwasong-13 (KN-08) ICBM,

“…at four missile bases at the ready for war. Jagang-do Juncheon-gun Unpo-ri and adjacent to the Yalu River, Jagang-do Hwapyeong-gun, North Pyeongan-do Sakju-gun, and South Pyeongan-do Unsan-gun.”10

The reference to the KN-08 in this press report may be in error as this system has never been confirmed as being tested and may have only been a prototype or retired. While this report doesn’t specifically mention the Yongnim Missile Operating Base, it does mention the town of Unpo-ri (운포리, 40.452356 126.318438), which is just 17 kilometers west of the base, and it is also within Chonchon-gun, which is where the Yongnim base is located. As there are no reported missile operating bases near Unpo-ri, it is presumed that this reference is a misidentification for the Yongnim Missile Operating Base.11 Two years later, another South Korean report references the unit housed at the Yongnim Missile Operating Base as being equipped with Hwasong-7 or Hwasong-9 MRBMs.12

There are at least seven reported ballistic missile tests conducted from Chagang-do from 2014 to the present. Of these, three are reported to have been short-range missiles and not likely to be from the unit based at the Yongnim Missile Operating Base. The four remaining missile tests are as follows.

DateReported LocationMissile Tested
2017-07-28Yongnim areaHwasong-14 ICBM, from inside the February 8 General Machine Factory13
2021-09-28Mupyong-ni area14 Hwasong-8 IRBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle15
2022-01-29Mupyong-ni areaHwasong-12 (KN-17) IRBM16
2022-10-04Mupyong-ni areaHwasong-12 (KN-17) IRBM17

Reliable sources indicate that for tests like those above, North Korea assembles an ad hoc combined team of Strategic Force personnel and industry technicians, engineers, and scientists.18 Given that all four of these test launches took place close to the Yongnim Missile Operating Base, it is likely that the Strategic Force personnel and launchers for these tests were drawn from the missile unit housed there. The fact that at least three different types of missiles were used in these tests may be an indicator that the missile unit housed at Yongnim Missile Operating Base is equipped with some combination of the Hwasong-12 IRBM, Hwasong-13 ICBM, and/or newer more capable missile systems. However, this requires further investigation.

Due to the strategic importance of the KPA’s ballistic missile operating bases and concerns of either pre-emptive or wartime airstrikes against these facilities, most missile operating bases have some level of organic air defense capabilities, are within the coverage of the national air defense missile shield, or both. This does not appear to be the case with the Yongnim Missile Operating Base. There are no readily identified fixed air defense artillery (ADA) artillery positions within the assessed perimeter of the missile base. However, there is a light ADA battery position 5 kilometers north of the missile base near the village of Won-dong. Under the most ideal conditions it could provide only minimal air defense for the northern section of the Yongnim base.

The nearest readily identifiable surface-to-air missile (SAM) base is at the February 8 General Machine Factory—approximately 17 kilometers north of the Yongnim base. This base is equipped with S-75 Dvina (NATO: SA-2 Guideline) missiles and may provide air defense coverage for the Yongnim base. The nearest Korean People’s Air and Air Defense Force airbase is the Changjin-up Airbase, 65 kilometers to the southeast. The base houses two air regiments—one equipped with MiG-19S second-generation fighters (NATO: Farmer) and a second equipped with H-5/IL-28 light bombers (NATO: Beagle). It is unlikely that either unit provides any direct support to the Yongnim Missile Operating Base.

Development

1994-2009

As noted above, construction of the Yongnim base is reported to have commenced sometime about 1994.19 One of the earliest readily available satellite images of the Yongnim Missile Operating Base was collected by a SPOT satellite on January 24, 1995. This 10-meter ground sample distance (i.e., resolution) panchromatic image shows ground scarring for what appears to be construction activity at the location of what would become the base’s hardened drive-through missile checkout facility and the base’s headquarters and administration area. It also shows that some of the headquarters and administration facilities had been built, and agricultural-related activity was underway along the Hwangrin-chon in the upper reaches of the valley at the southern end. Unfortunately, due to insufficient resolution, it doesn’t provide any insight into the status of the various UGF entrances.

One of the earliest available images of the Yongnim Missile Operating base acquired by an Airbus SPOT 3 satellite, January 24, 1995. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Subsequently, in 1999, published sources first identified Yongnim as the location as a missile operating base:

According to the military and intelligence authorities on 30 June, North Korea [is] pushing the construction of large-scale underground … facilities to transport missiles in three areas — namely, besides Yongnim, Yongjo-tong of Poptong County in Kangwon Province and Sangnam-ri of Hoch’on County in South Hamgyong Province.20

While no specific missile type was associated with the Yongnim-dong facility in these earlier reports, subsequent reporting in 2000 and 2001 citing ROK intelligence officials stated that it would house either Nodong or Taepodong 1 or 2 missiles as opposed to earlier estimates of either Hwasong-7 (Nodong) or Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) systems.21 Subsequently, a 2016 report citing ROK intelligence states that it was likely equipped with the Hwasong-13 (KN-08), however, this report may been in error as the KN-08 has not been confirmed as having been tested.22

In March 2001, ROK intelligence officials reported that the construction of the Sangnam-ni, Yongjo-ri, and Yongnim-dong missile operating bases was 60-80% complete. A 60-centimeter, multispectral image acquired the following year on May 13, 2002, supports this assessment, showing the base during its early stage of development. A small entrance/checkpoint is located north of Kupawon. At Kupawon, the barracks and housing areas have yet to be completed, and the barracks area consists of just seven buildings. Several small agricultural buildings were located 400-1,200 meters southwest of the barracks area.

The same May 13, 2002, image shows that at the Sagaegol housing area, immediately south of Kupawon, ten new housing structures have recently been completed. The headquarters and administration area in the Simnipyong area is in its early stages of development, with approximately 44 structures present. Across the Hwangrin-chon from the headquarters and administration area, the housing area only has eight structures. To the northeast, the small village of Kosu-dong consists of approximately 12 structures that do not appear to support the base significantly. Less than six structures are present in the area that will eventually be home to the small logging village of Sinsang-dong, located to the east of the headquarters and administration area in the branch valley. Five years later, an October 4, 2007, image shows that at the Sagaegol housing area, immediately south of Kupawon, 12 additional housing structures had been completed.

Heading south along the main valley, the May 13, 2002, image shows the first support area on the west bank of the Hwangrin-chon has yet to be developed and consists of only six structures. However, on the east bank of the Hwangrin-chon are three small agricultural compounds with ten structures. These compounds appear to be in the early stages of being razed. Approximately 1 kilometer to the south, on the west bank of the Hwangrin-chon, is a small agricultural compound consisting of four structures that will soon become a second support facility for the missile base.

Approximately 640 meters to the south, where the valley forks, construction of the base’s two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities appears to have been recently completed, as the vegetation planted on the roofs of these structures has yet to bloom to any extent. Each facility consists of a large concrete reinforced shelter cut into the side of the adjacent mountain, measures approximately 19 meters long, has a 12-meter opening at each end, and is covered with soil with vegetation planted on top. As noted above, the length and size of these openings are of sufficient size to accommodate all but the largest KPA ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), mobile-erector-launchers (MELs), transporter-erectors (TEs), and missile support vehicles and equipment. Approximately 120 meters north of these facilities is a support building and a recently constructed deck bridge across the Hwangrin-chon. Approximately 160 meters south of these facilities is a recently constructed small deck bridge that leads to four small UGF entrances.

Approximately 800 meters southeast of the hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, along both banks of the Hwangrin-chon, are the remains of at least five small agricultural compounds. A motor vehicle maintenance and support facility and a barracks facility will subsequently be built here. Approximately 650 meters further south and on the east bank of the Hwangrin-chon are the remains of at least two small agricultural compounds. A barracks compound will subsequently be built here.

Although there are no indications of its presence in the May 13, 2002, image, approximately 860 meters further south and on the west bank of the Hwangrin-chon from the previous location is a large UGF entrance, which was likely built during the late 1990s. Due to tree and other vegetation growth is often challenging to identify it in satellite imagery. Approximately 3 kilometers southeast of the hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities, along the west bank of the Hwangrin-chon, is a cleared area that will subsequently be developed into the agricultural village of Chongjagye. Approximately a further 650 meters south and also on the west bank of the Hwangrin-chon is a cleared area that will subsequently be developed into agricultural support. The May 13, 2002, image provides no significant indications of these forthcoming developments.

Finally, approximately 1.2 kilometers south of what will become the agricultural village of Chongjagye, the Hwangrin-chon makes a sharp turn to the northeast. Although there are no indications of it in the May 13, 2002, image, a small agricultural activity was observed here two years later in a June 10, 2004, image.

In May 2004, South Korean sources indicated that the Yongnim base was now “…70 to 80 percent completed…”23 Three satellite images collected during November and December 2006 show that progress continued at the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities. Two years later, an image collected on April 15, 2008, indicates that construction had been completed and that vegetation on top of the facilities was beginning to fill in—making easy detection somewhat more challenging. Barring any other unforeseen expansion, these developments suggest that the base’s first construction phase was largely completed between 2008 and 2010.

A 2008 book citing Korean-language sources reported that the Yongnim Ballistic Missile Operating Base would probably be armed with missiles that could reach “Guam; Okinawa; U.S. military forces in Japan” implying that the missiles were MRBMs or IRBM systems.24

2010-2016

Readily available high-resolution satellite imagery of the Yongnim Missile Operating Base during the 2010s is somewhat limited. However, an image collected on November 14, 2010, shows that the barracks and housing facilities in the Kupawon area had slowly expanded and now consisted of a total of 13 buildings. Included among these were several barracks. Additionally, approximately 250 meters along the hill southwest of the barracks compound, a small support area with eight buildings was established. Further along this hillside, several small agricultural buildings had been razed by November 14, 2010. As noted above, the remains of these buildings appear to have mistakenly been reported as bunkers. A subsequent satellite image collected on January 5, 2018, shows that the small support area 250 meters southwest of the barracks compound had been razed and replaced by a larger building. No significant changes have occurred in this area since that time.

The same November 14, 2010, image shows that the headquarters and administration area around Simnipyong continued to develop, with approximately 50 structures present. In the housing area across the Hwangrin-chon from the headquarters and administration, there were about 32 structures present. There were also some minor changes to the small village of Kosu-dong northeast of the area. Development in these areas remained modest over the next four years. However, an image collected on April 5, 2014, showed that what would become a project to update the headquarters compound had recently begun. Four years later, this project resulted in the construction of at least four new buildings, gardens, and propaganda monuments.

The only changes observed at the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities approximately 3.2 kilometers southeast of Simnipyong during this period were the maturing vegetation consisting of trees and bushes on top of each structure. As noted above, this growth makes it increasingly challenging to locate them using commercial satellite imagery in all but winter months, during which long shadows also provide a challenge.

On September 1, 2014, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported that North Korea fired a short-range missile from “near Ryongrim County, in Chagang Province, around 10:30 a.m. yesterday [August 31, 2014].25 The missile reportedly flew approximately 220 kilometers and impacted the East Sea (Sea of Japan) between the city of Kimchaek (김책) and Hwadae-gun (Hwadae County, 화대군) North Hamgyong Province. The South Korean JCS reported that this “is the first time the North fired a missile from Chagang Province, an inland area.”26 While the specific type of missile was not identified at the time, some sources suggested that it was now “a new improved version of the KN-02 short-range missile or a Scud missile.”27

Two years later, a 2016 South Korea report citing intelligence sources reported that North Korea had deployed the KN-08 ICBM:

“…at four missile bases at the ready for war. Jagang-do Juncheon-gun Unpo-ri and adjacent to the Yalu River, Jagang-do Hwapyeong-gun, North Pyeongan-do Sakju-gun, and South Pyeongan-do Unsan-gun.”28

As noted above, while this report doesn’t mention the Yongnim Missile Operating Base specifically, it does mention the town of Unpo-ri (운포리, 40.452356 126.318438), which is just 17 kilometers west of the base and within the same county (Chunchon-gun) as the base. As there have been no additional reliable reports of a missile operating base in the vicinity of Unpo-ri and a review of satellite imagery does not reveal a base in the area, the use of Unpo-ri is likely a misidentification for the Yongnim Missile Operating Base.

2017-2020

A review of high-resolution satellite imagery of the Yongnim Missile Operating Base from 2017 through 2020 shows that sometime between January 5, 2018, and December 3, 2020, the Sagaegol housing area was expanded to now include approximately 25 housing structures and that there were some minor changes in the headquarters and administration area. Additional minor changes were observed to the agricultural and forestry activities dispersed along the valley’s length and on the adjacent slopes above the Yongnim Missile Operating Base. These changes are typical of those observed at large KPA bases and missile operating bases in mountainous parts of the country.

In a much-publicized event on July 28, 2017, Kim Jong-un observed the launch of a Hwasong-14 (KN-20) ICBM from the February 8 General Machine Factory.29 It is likely that the unit launching the missile was based at the Yongnim Missile Operating Base, just 15 kilometers to the south.

An image of the Hwasong-14 test launch from the February 8 General Machine Factory, July 29, 2017 (Rodong Sinmun)

The following year, in November 2018, a South Korean report identified the unit housed at the Yongnim Missile Operating Base as being equipped with the Hwasong-7 (Nodong) or Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) MRBMs.30 This, however, appears to have been based on old information.31

2020-Present

Comparison of satellite imagery from 2010 through 2024 shows that there have been numerous small changes to almost all the small support and agricultural and forestry activities (many often transitory) located along the banks of the Hwangrin-chon over the years.32 As noted above, these changes are typical of those observed in mountainous areas of North Korea and, to a lesser degree, at other missile operating bases. Today, those agricultural and forestry activities within or adjacent to the current base’s presumed perimeter are likely used to support the base.33

Despite this low-level infrastructure activity within the Yongnim Missile Operating Base, there were three reported missile launches from the areas around the base. It is likely that these tests were supported by the missile unit housed here.

On September 28, 2021, North Korea’s KCNA reported that “The National Defense Academy conducted a test launch of the newly developed hypersonic missile ‘Mars-8 type’ in… [Yongnim-gun], Jagangdo on the morning of the 28th.” The missile was a Hwasong-8 IRBM (KN-17) mounting a hypersonic glide vehicle, which reportedly flew under 200 kilometers with an altitude of around 30 kilometers.34

Five months later, on January 30, 2022, North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun reported that North Korea had conducted an “evaluation test-fire of Hwasong 12-type ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile.” The Rodong Sinmun announcement went on to state that the test “confirmed the accuracy, security and effectiveness of the operation of the Hwasong 12-type weapon system under production.” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that “it detected the missile, fired at a steep angle from Mupyong-ni in the northern province of Chagang, at 7:52 a.m., and it flew about 800 kilometers at a top altitude of 2,000 km.”35 The Mupyong-ni area is 18-23 kilometers north of the Yongnim Missile Operating Base.

On October 4, 2022, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that North Korea had conducted the launch of what is believed to have been a Hwasong-12 IRBM that day at around 7:23 am from the area of Mupyong-ni, Chagang Province. The missile flew 4,500 km over the Japanese archipelago, reached an altitude of 970 kilometers, and attained a speed of Mach 17.36

From as early as February 9, 2023 and until at least September 6, 2023, a work project was undertaken at the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities. The visible work consisted of the erecting of a framework over parts of both facilities. This framework was, for some of this time, covered by what appear to have been camouflage tarps or netting. These camouflage tarps or nets were somewhat like those occasionally seen over the entrances to Korean People’s Navy underground berthing facilities. The precise purpose for the work is uncertain. However, it could have easily been for repair, construction, or even temporary concealment of certain missile-related activities.

Finally, available satellite imagery provides no evidence of any damage being caused to the base from either a September 19, 2024, 3.9 magnitude earthquake that had an epicenter 22 kilometers east of the base or the recent heavy rains that struck the northern section of the country.37

Research Notes

This report, as are the others in this series, is based upon an ongoing study of the Korean People’s Army ballistic missile infrastructure begun by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in 1985. The author first became aware of what is now identified as the Yongnim Missile Operating Base during a conversation with an informed source in the early 2000s—shortly after the first signs of construction were observed.38 This study is based upon numerous interviews with North Korean defectors, declassified documents, open source reporting, and interviews with government, defense, and intelligence officials around the world. Accuracy in any discussion of North Korea’s nuclear, biological, chemical, or ballistic missile programs is always a challenge, and while some of the information used in the preparation of this report may eventually prove to be incomplete or incorrect, it is hoped that it provides a new and unique look into the subject. The information presented here supersedes or updates previous works by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. on these subjects.

Although 24 high- and medium-resolution satellite images were analyzed during the preparation of this report, the few presented in this report were purposely selected for their sensor resolutions, off-nadir angle, unique view, or absence of foliage. The latter allows for a more unobstructed and detailed view of the structures and activities within and around the Yongnim missile operating base.

Gazetteer of Named Places

NameCoordinates
Chongjagye (청자계)40.434079, 126.538964
Chikkol-san (직골산)40.449639, 126.460972
Kosu-dong (거수동)40.491032, 126.518289
Kupawon (구파원)40.486675, 126.491411
Mupyong-ni (무평리)40.685833, 126.459166
Paek-san (백산)40.449639, 126.460972
Riman-do (리만리)40.529406, 126.417473
Riman-yok (리만역)40.530808, 126.421066
Sagaegol (사개골)40.484668, 126.494100
Simnipyong (십리평)40.481947, 126.500619
Sinsang-dong (신상동)40.481089, 126.547564
Unpo-ri (운포리)40.482144, 126.328222
Won-dong (원동)40.512425 126.456312
Yanghap (양합)40.519579 126.437617

References

  1. A February 2015 article in Jane’s Intelligence Review correctly identifies missile related components of the February 8 General Machine Factory (2.8 Machine Factory), however, incorrectly identifies the location of the Yongnim Missile Operating Base. Puccioni, Allison. “IHS Jane’s examines North Korean missile bases,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 12, 2015. Yongnim has been variously transliterated as Ryonglim, Ryongrim, Yonglim, Yongnim-dong, Yongnim-gun, Yongnim-ni, Yongrim, or identified as the Riman-ri, Ryongrim-gun, Yongnim-up, Yongrim-dong, Yongrim-eup, Yongrim-up, or Paek-san East Ballistic Missile Base.
  2. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; and Kim Min-suk. “North Korea continues expansion of missile base,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 6, 2001, https://news.joins.com/article/4045753.
  3. It is interesting to note that only recently has North Korea openly acknowledged that Kim Jong-un or his predecessors had visited an operational strategic ballistic missile operating base. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Strategic Missile Bases,” Rodong Sinmun, October 23, 2024.
  4. All KPA units have official and cover designations. The latter is what is commonly seen being used in North Korea media. For example, a fictional unit mentioned in Rodong Sinmun might have a cover designation of “KPA Unit 702.” However, its official designation is the “123rd Infantry Division.” Some units also have an honorific name assigned to their official designation in recognition of some significant accomplishment. Using our example, “KPA Unit 702” would be the “123rd Guards Infantry Division.” The “Guards” honorific has been applied in recognition of the unit’s accomplishments during the Korean War. To further complicate, it is not unusual for a cover designation to be randomly changed. Cover designations are sometimes referred to as “military unit cover designation” (MUCD).
  5. Over the years this factory has also been known as the: No. 65 Plant, Mupyong-ni Munitions Factory, or Mupyong-ni Arms Factory.
  6. Interestingly, there is no readily identifiable cultural education hall as seen at most missile bases and large KPA bases.
  7. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; Yi Yong-chong: “Taepo Dong-2 Manufactured at Namp’o on Its Way in Camouflage to Launch Site,” JoongAng Ilbo, June, 20, 2006; and Hwang, Yang-joon. “North Korea Builds Six Bases for 550 km-range Missiles,” Hankook Ilbo, October 27, 1999.
  8. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
  9. For example, see: Ahn Hyung-young. “North Korea is operating ICBM sites within four places such as Unpo-ri… ‘KN-08 already has been deployed’,” TV Chosun, October 24, 2016; and Son Hyo-joo. “Government: “Keeping quiet for fear of North Korea noticing surveillance… Also finished preparing for strike in case of emergency,” Dong-A Ilbo, November 15, 2018, http://news.donga.com/3/all/20181115/92877807/1.
  10.   Ahn Hyung-young. “North Korea is operating ICBM sites within four places such as Unpo-ri… ‘KN-08 already has been deployed’,” TV Chosun, October 24, 2016.
  11. Ibid.
  12. Son Hyo-joo. “Government: Remained Silent so North Korea would not notice surveillance,” Dong-a Ilbo, November 15, 2018, http://news.donga.com/3/all/20181115/92877807/1.
  13. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press/release/2017/07/29b.pdf, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press/release/2017/07/29a.pdf, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/28/540008218/north-korea-h-ballistic-missile-seoul-and-the-pentagon-say?, and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/28/north-korea-fires-missile-japan-reports-say.
  14. It is likely that these did not take place from within the February 8 General Machine Factory.
  15. Park Eun-kyung. “North Korea announced “The first successful test launch of the Hwaseong-8 type of the ultrasonic missile,” September 29, 2021, https://www.khan.co.kr/politics/north-korea/article/202109290654001; Zwirko, Zwirko. “North Korea tested new ‘hypersonic missile’: state media,” NK News, September 28, 2021, https://www.nknews.org/2021/09/north-korea-tested-new-hypersonic-missile-state-media/; Panda, Ankit. “North Korea’s claimed new hypersonic glide vehicle” Twitter, September 28, 2021, https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1442961975361916928?s=20; Sarah Kim. “North’s missile is sixth major weapons test this year”, Joongang, September 28, 2021, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/09/28/national/northKorea/North-Korea-missile-NSC/20210928113255980.html; and Sarah Kim. “North keeps up pressure with missile launch,” Joongang, September 28, 2021, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/09/28/national/northKorea/North-Korea-KoreaUS-missile/20210928180553233.html.
  16. “Test-fire of Hwasong 12-type Ground-to-ground Intermediate- and Long-range Ballistic Missile Held,” Rodong Sinmun, January 30, 2022, http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/; Song Sang-ho. “N. Korea fires intermediate-range ballistic missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military,” Yonhap, January 30, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220130000353325?section=nk/nk; “Test-fire of Hwasong 12-type Ground-to-ground Intermediate- and Long-range Ballistic Missile Held,” KCNA, January 31, 2022; and “January saw the most North Korean missile tests, including the longest-range one, in years,” Washington Post, January 31, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/31/north-korea-missile-tests/?.
  17. Deuk-kwan ko. “North Korean missile flew 4,500 km, reached an altitude of 970 km, and reached a speed of Mach 17,” Maeil Business Newspaper, October 4, 2022, https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/10475715; Choe Sang-han. “North Korea Says It Is Building Underwater Nuclear Weapons Silos,” New York Times, October 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/10/world/asia/north-korea-underwater-nuclear-missiles.html; Motoko Rich and Choe Sang-han. “North Korea Fires Powerful Missile, Using Old Playbook in a New World,” New York Times, October 3, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/03/world/asia/japan-north-korea-missile.html?; and Cha, Victor, Ellen Kim, and Andy Lim. “North Korea Tests Missile over Japan,” CSIS: Critical Questions, October 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea-tests-missile-over-japan-0.
  18. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
  19. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; and Kim Min-suk. “North Korea continues expansion of missile base,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 6, 2001, https://news.joins.com/article/4045753.
  20. “DPRK Allegedly Constructing Missile Pit Sites for Launch,” Choson Ilbo, June 30, 1999. See also: Kim, Gui Geun, “North Korea Constructing Underground Shafts in Three Locations Including Yongnim,” Yonhap News, June 30, 1999, https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=001&aid=0004544324, “Further on DPRK Underground Missile Facilities.” Hangyore, July 8, 1999, p. 2, and “Where Has North Korea Hidden Its Missiles/10 Launch Sides Including China Border Region,” Segye Ilbo, June 8, 1999, http://www.segye.com/newsView/19990708000053.
  21. Ibid.; and Kim Min-suk, ”North Korea Continues to Expand Missile Base, Joongang Ilbo, March 6, 2001, https://news.joins.com/article/4045753; and Kim Min-suk, “North Builds Missile Power as World Debates U.S. Plan,” Joongang Ilbo, March 12, 2001, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=1885657. JoongAng Ilbo, March 6, 2001, https://news.joins.com/article/4045753.
  22. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; and Ahn Hyung-young. “North Korea is operating ICBM sites within four places such as Unpo-ri… ‘KN-08 already has been deployed’,” TV Chosun, October 24, 2016.
  23. Ibid.: and “Pyongyang is Constructing New Sites for Ballistic Missiles,” Korea Herald, May 5, 2004; “US Source DPRK Has Five Missile Bases,” Yomiuri Weekly, June 1, 2003, pp. 21-23; and Yu Yong-won, “North Korea Continues Secret Build-up Including Construction of Three Underground Bases in Rear Area,” Choson Ilbo, March 1, 2001.
  24. Pinkston, Daniel A. The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, (Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania) February 2008, p. 50.
  25. “North Fires Missile Near Chinese Border into Sea,” JoongAng Daily, September 1, 2014; and “N. Korea Fires Missile from Chinese Border Area,” Chosun Ilbo, September 2, 2014, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/09/02/2014090200902.html, and Chung, Sung Taek, “DPRK Launches a Short-Range Projectile Near North Korea-China Border,” DongA Ilbo, September 2, 2014, http://news.donga.com/3/all/20140902/66156777/1.
  26. Ibid.
  27. Ibid.
  28. Ahn Hyung-young. “North Korea is operating ICBM sites within four places such as Unpo-ri… ‘KN-08 already has been deployed’,” TV Chosun, October 24, 2016
  29. Over the years this factory has also been known as the No. 65 Plant, Mup’yong-ni Munitions Factory, or Mupyong-ni Arms Factory.
  30. Son Hyo-joo. “Government: Remained Silent so North Korea would not notice surveillance,” Dong-a Ilbo, November 15, 2018, http://news.donga.com/3/all/20181115/92877807/1.
  31. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
  32. Additionally, at various times over the years, there have been several small footbridges across the stream up and down the valley.
  33. Most Korean People’s Army units are responsible for producing a portion of their own food each year.
  34. Park Eun-kyung. “North Korea announced “The first successful test launch of the Hwaseong-8 type of the ultrasonic missile,” September 29, 2021, https://www.khan.co.kr/politics/north-korea/article/202109290654001; Zwirko, Zwirko. “North Korea tested new ‘hypersonic missile’: state media,” NK News, September 28, 2021, https://www.nknews.org/2021/09/north-korea-tested-new-hypersonic-missile-state-media/; Panda, Ankit. “North Korea’s claimed new hypersonic glide vehicle” Twitter, September 28, 2021, https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1442961975361916928?s=20; Sarah Kim. “North’s missile is sixth major weapons test this year”, Joongang, September 28, 2021, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/09/28/national/northKorea/North-Korea-missile-NSC/20210928113255980.html; and Sarah Kim. “North keeps up pressure with missile launch,” Joongang, September 28, 2021, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/09/28/national/northKorea/North-Korea-KoreaUS-missile/20210928180553233.html.
  35. “Test-fire of Hwasong 12-type Ground-to-ground Intermediate- and Long-range Ballistic Missile Held,” Rodong Sinmun, January 30, 2022, http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/; Song Sang-ho. “N. Korea fires intermediate-range ballistic missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military,” Yonhap, January 30, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220130000353325?section=nk/nk; “Test-fire of Hwasong 12-type Ground-to-ground Intermediate- and Long-range Ballistic Missile Held,” KCNA, January 31, 2022; and “January saw the most North Korean missile tests, including the longest-range one, in years,” Washington Post, January 31, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/31/north-korea-missile-tests/?.
  36. Deuk-kwan ko. “North Korean missile flew 4,500 km, reached an altitude of 970 km, and reached a speed of Mach 17,” Maeil Business Newspaper, October 4, 2022, https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/10475715; Choe Sang-han. “North Korea Says It Is Building Underwater Nuclear Weapons Silos,” New York Times, October 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/10/world/asia/north-korea-underwater-nuclear-missiles.html; Motoko Rich and Choe Sang-han. “North Korea Fires Powerful Missile, Using Old Playbook in a New World,” New York Times, October 3, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/03/world/asia/japan-north-korea-missile.html?; and Cha, Victor, Ellen Kim, and Andy Lim. “North Korea Tests Missile over Japan,” CSIS: Critical Questions, October 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea-tests-missile-over-japan-0
  37. “3.9 magnitude earthquake hits northwestern N. Korea: KMA,” Yonhap, September 19, 2024.
  38. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.