September 23, 2020 Victor Cha—
Over the course of 30 elections since 1956, Beyond Parallel measured the period of time before or after an election in which a North Korean provocation happens and found the provocation window has grown more narrow over time. That is, North Korean missile/nuclear tests and other major kinetic provocations have clustered increasingly closer to U.S. elections.
December 11, 2019 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
On December 7, North Korea conducted what it described as a “…very important test at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground.” Satellite imagery in the days leading up to and after the test clearly shows that this was a rocket engine test at the vertical engine test stand at Sohae. This test was most probably of a liquid-fuel rocket engine as only liquid-fuel rocket engines have previously been tested here, while large solid rocket motors have been tested at the Magunpo Solid Rocket Motor Test Facility on the east coast and elsewhere. Whether the liquid-fuel rocket engine was an existing model or a new one is unknown.
December 4, 2019 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
There is no evidence that the “newly built submarine” inspected by Kim Jong-un on July 23, 2019 has been launched. While many media sources have described this new submarine as an imminent threat, it is more accurate to describe it as an emerging threat. The large canopy constructed during late-August and early-September that conceals much of the submarine dock precludes confirmation that the existing SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine (SSBA) is present.
October 9, 2019 Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha and Dana Kim—
The October 2, 2019 Pukguksong-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test launch has raised concerns over the forthcoming launch of North Korea’s first true ballistic missile submarine (SSB) as described in the Beyond Parallel Snapshot, which was published the same day.
October 2, 2019 Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha and Dana Kim—
Around 7:11 am on October 2 (KST), North Korea launched what may have been a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from waters northeast of the Wonsan, Kangwon Province area into the sea between Korea and Japan. The last Beyond Parallel report on the Sinpo South Shipyard indicated the possibility of ongoing preparations for a launch.
August 28, 2019 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
New Beyond Parallel imagery (August 26, 2019) of Sinpo South Shipyard suggests circumstantial evidence of the construction of a new ballistic missile submarine and preliminary evidence indicates possible preparations for a test... New Beyond Parallel imagery (August 26, 2019) of Sinpo South Shipyard suggests circumstantial evidence of…
August 2, 2019 Victor Cha and Dana Kim—
Three projectile launches, all within the past eight days, demonstrate North Korea’s intention to perfect its short-range strike capabilities, guidance systems, and solid fuel development... North Korea conducted three separate tests that launched two projectiles each on July 25 (KN-23…
March 25, 2019 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
Satellite imagery acquired on March 21, 2019 and over the past six months indicates that the No. 17 Explosives Factory near Hamhung is active. While no significant changes have occurred with its infrastructure during this period, the factory was expanded during 2012 with the construction of a large mixing/casting facility capable of producing large solid-propellant rocket motors for ballistic missiles.
March 19, 2019 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
While recent activity at the Sohae Launch facility appears to have returned it to operational status after DPRK dismantlement measures earlier in the summer, there has been no activity of significance at the vertical engine test stand or launch pad since early March.
March 9, 2019 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha—
Commercial satellite imagery acquired on both March 6 and March 8, 2019, shows that North Korea has continued preparations on the launch pad and the vertical engine test stand at the Sohae Launch Facility. Based on past practices, these activities could be consistent with preparations for the delivery of a rocket to the launch pad or engine to the test stand; or, they could be North Korean coercive bargaining tactics after the failed Hanoi summit.