38 related posts found

Sohae Launch Facility Update—Work Continues; Concealment of Launch Pad and Engine Test Stand

Military, Nuclear Weapons
March 9, 2019, by and — Commercial satellite imagery acquired on both March 6 and March 8, 2019, shows that North Korea has continued preparations on the launch pad and the vertical engine test stand at the Sohae Launch Facility. Based on past practices, these activities could be consistent with preparations for the delivery of a rocket to the launch pad or engine to the test stand; or, they could be North Korean coercive bargaining tactics after the failed Hanoi summit.

Undeclared North Korea: The Sino-ri Missile Operating Base and Strategic Force Facilities

Military, Nuclear Weapons
January 21, 2019, by , and — Located 212 kilometers north of the DMZ, Sino-ri is an operational missile base that houses a regiment-sized unit equipped with Nodong-1/-2 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM). It is one of the oldest of approximately 20 undeclared missile operating bases and is reported to serve as the headquarters of the Strategic Rocket Forces Nodong missile brigade. It may have also played a role in development of the newest generation Pukkuksong-2 (KN-15) ballistic missile first tested or unveiled by North Korea on February 12, 2017.

Summit Silver Lining: Absence of North Korean Provocations Continue

Analysis, Foreign Affairs, Nuclear Weapons
June 11, 2018, by — There has been much criticism of President Trump's impulsive actions and the unconventionality of the Singapore Summit. However, absent a complete breakdown of the encounter between the leaders, the summit is likely to produce a negotiation process between the United States and North Korea that will implement the mandates laid out by the leaders on denuclearization, security assurances, and a peace process on the Korean peninsula.

No Launch Activity in Advance of Inter-Korean Summit

Military
April 23, 2018— On Saturday April 21, commercial satellite imagery from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station indicates minimal to no activity ahead of the inter-Korean summit. While dwindled ground activity could be attributed to the fact that images were taken during a weekend, the absence of any parked vehicular traffic and human activity suggests compliance with the leadership’s declaration, coming out of the Third Plenary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party.

The Devil’s Weapons: What Ordinary North Koreans Think about their Nuclear Program

Analysis, Nuclear Weapons
March 2, 2018, by and — Reports of ubiquitous celebrations of nuclear weapons accomplishments stand in stark contrast with a new micro-survey commissioned by Beyond Parallel of North Korean citizens. Conducted throughout the summer and fall of 2017 with a cross-section of North Korean citizens, the vast majority of North Korean respondents did not have a positive attitude toward their country’s nuclear weapons program.