February 15, 2018, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Beyond Parallel—
Key among North Korea’s military capabilities are its special operations forces. Embedded within North Korea's special operations forces are two unique navy “sniper” brigades that are subordinate to the Korean People’s Navy. Hovercraft units that operate as part of these brigades have been trained to carry out a more specialized task—amphibious assault landings and infiltration missions.
February 8, 2018, by Victor Cha and Marie DuMond—
A study commissioned by Beyond Parallel of North Koreans currently living inside the country found that 34 of 36 of respondents, or 94.4%, felt that unification is necessary. The majority of respondents, 44.1%, cited the shared ethnicity between North and South Korean’s as the main reason unification should occur.
February 5, 2018, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Beyond Parallel—
Satellite imagery analysis shows that North Korea continues to develop its conventional military forces in targeted areas. Construction on a new hovercraft base near Yonbong-ni could indicate a significant escalation of the navy sniper brigade threat to the ROK islands in the West Sea and ports along the coast.
January 25, 2018, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Beyond Parallel—
North Korea has one of the largest special operations forces (SOF) in the world with specially trained, elite soldiers numbering close to 200,000. Among these unique special operations forces today are two navy “sniper” brigades. North Korean hovercraft units—a key element in supporting navy sniper brigades' offensive operations—have evolved and become more threatening over time as a result of restructuring, modernization and construction of new bases closer to the Northern Limit Line.
January 10, 2018, by Sue Mi Terry—
The two Koreas held their first talks this week in over two years. Reflective of the thaw in inter-Korean relations brought about by North Korea’s participation in the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics, predictive signals by Predata/CSIS Beyond Parallel indicate a decreased likelihood of North Korean WMD activity within the next 14-day window. The predictive signal reached its lowest level since October 28, 2017. The 7-day and 14-day predictive signals also reached their lowest levels on January 9 since November 25, 2017.
December 21, 2017, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Lisa Collins—
In July and September 2017, unconfirmed reports circulated about dramatically fluctuating gasoline and diesel prices in North Korea. There were also reports that China was planning to suspend or limit fuel exports to North Korea. Analysis of satellite imagery from around this period indicates that a fuel suspension of any significant length does not appear to have affected Pyongyang.
December 13, 2017, by Robert King—
Testimony of Ambassador Robert R. King before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Hearing on “Protecting North Korean Refugees.” The United States' human rights efforts are an important aspect of our policy toward North Korea. We must not underestimate the value and importance of these efforts.
December 5, 2017, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Lisa Collins—
On November 24, 2017, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told reporters that the Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge will be closed temporarily in the “near future” for repairs. A detailed analysis of DigitalGlobe satellite imagery from November 24th shows no activity on the bridge—repair or otherwise.
December 4, 2017, by Marie DuMond—
South Korea and the United States generally share similar estimations of China’s and Japan’s blind spots in a unification scenario. Both believe that Beijing has the most prominent blind spot on domestic stabilization and refugees, and that Japan shares similar concerns, suggesting that all four powers could prioritize law and order in a unification scenario.
November 22, 2017, by Marie DuMond—
On November 22, predictive signals by Predata/CSIS Beyond Parallel indicate there is an elevated likelihood of a North Korean WMD activity in the next 14 to 30 day windows. The likelihood of WMD activity in the coming weeks is tempered by the fact that, historically, North Korea has not conducted many tests in the November and December timeframe.