To study the relationship between North Korean provocations and South Korean elections, Beyond Parallel created a new database of events incorporating both presidential and national assembly elections from the Republic of Korea (ROK) over the last six decades. The event set was cross-tabulated with Beyond Parallel’s original dataset on North Korean provocations. Based on this cross-comparison, the correlation between North Korean provocations and South Korean elections was calculated in terms of a “provocation window.” The provocation window was defined as the number of days or weeks between a North Korean provocation and an ROK election event (either before or after it occurred).

This new study is one of the first to examine the relationship between ROK elections and North Korean provocations with the key findings listed below.

Key Findings

• The provocation window between South Korean elections and North Korean provocations has become more narrow over time. A previous Beyond Parallel study also found that North Korean kinetic provocations, including missile and nuclear tests, have clustered increasingly closer to U.S. elections.
• Under Kim Jong-un, the average window for a North Korean provocation bracketed around all ROK elections is 6.5 days (about 1 week). The average for presidential elections is 15 days or about two weeks.
• This represents a significant change from previous periods: Under the leadership of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il the window was an average of about 10 and 11 weeks respectively.
• There has been a transformation in the types of kinetic provocations that North Korea has carried out over the last 20 years. The provocations are now overwhelmingly comprised of missile and nuclear tests rather than other types of conventional kinetic military actions.
• This pattern suggests a provocation as early as two weeks before the South Korean elections on May 9th. The start of the provocation window falls on Military Foundation Day (April 25), a holiday in North Korea, and 10 days after the 105th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday on April 15th (KST).

On use of graph note following:

• The red line represents the day of the election. Points above and below the redline represent North Korean provocations before and after an election.
• When a user hovers on a particular point they can view the amount of days before or after an election and the specific date and type of provocation.
• Viewers can zoom into a particular point in time by clicking the left mouse button and dragging their mouse across the graph. A specific window of data can also be downloaded.
• Users can also toggle between national assembly and presidential datasets. To do this click on the specific type of election at the bottom of graph.

ROK Elections and DPRK Provocations Since 1958

This data demonstrates, along with other forms of qualitative information, that the relationship between South Korea and North Korea over the last 60 years has remained highly competitive and conflictual. Despite limited progress made during brief periods of economic cooperation and political reconciliation, inter-Korean relations are still highly antagonistic due to domestic economic and political imperatives, geopolitical dynamics, and historical grievances.

In the past, the inter-Korean conflict manifested itself primarily through conventional military clashes along the borders of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea. Both North and South Korea historically engaged in activities that sought to undermine each other’s military power and respective political and economic systems. In the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea even pursued a deliberate strategy of using guerilla warfare tactics to create disruptions in the South Korean government. This included sending highly trained North Korean forces to infiltrate South Korean territory and carry out destructive special operations. In 1984, North Korea also started testing its indigenous missiles developed through technical cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The nature of the inter-Korean conflict has changed over the last 20-30 years, however, because of North Korea’s increasingly rapid development of asymmetric threat capabilities and non-conventional weapons systems. This includes major advancements in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles systems as well as sophisticated cyber operations. The changing trend is clear from an analysis of North Korean provocations over the last six decades as well as their connection to important domestic events in South Korea like political elections.

Other Findings

• There was one instance in the past when North Korea welcomed the South Korean elections with a provocation on the same day–that was the date of the national assembly elections held in December 1978.
• In conducting provocations before or after an election period North Korea did not necessarily discriminate between liberal and conservative ROK presidents. North Korea in fact launched an anti-cruise ship missile on the same day that former president Roh Moo-hyun was inaugurated into office, that is 67 days after his election.
• In terms of the total volume of provocations, the largest uptick in the number of events over the sixty year period occurred between 1966-1969 and 2012-2017.

ROK Elections and DPRK Provocations

Additional considerations

• Sample size: The sample size for the Kim Jong-un period is small (one presidential and two national assembly elections).
• Provocation: We define a provocation as an intentional action taken by North Korea that breaches the sovereignty of another country, causes significant personal injury or damage to property, and/or constitutes a serious violation of international law for particular diplomatic, military, or political objectives.
• Average provocation window: A total of all provocation windows closest to an election were calculated and then divided by the total number of ROK elections that took place under the ruling period of each North Korean leader.
• Correlation only: Our study indicates a pattern in North Korean provocations around South Korean elections. We do not suggest that elections cause the provocations. Our findings also do not deny that there may be multiple causes for the timing of North Korean actions including technology-related goals, military variables, and domestic-political objectives.
• Time Period: To limit the effects of the Korean War conflict on this analysis, we selected 1958 as the starting year for this study. This is despite the fact that Kim Il-sung officially became the North Korean supreme leader almost 10 years prior to 1958.
Research assistance for this database provided by David Hong.